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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Banks and Banking-Collection Claims against
Assets of Insolvent National Banks.
The National Banking Act directs the comptroller to make ratable
distribution of the assets of insolvent national banks." This prevents
preferred claims against the assets of an insolvent national bank, except
where property is held in trust by the bank,2 or in situations which
justify an application of the equitable doctrine of constructive trust,3 as
where deposits were received at a time when the bank was knowingly
insolvent. 4 Thus the owner of an item sent for collection and remittance
to a national bank which became insolvent after collecting the item but
before remitting the proceeds is in the position of a general creditor,
unless he shows, first, that a particular fund has been augmented by the
collection transaction, or that the proceeds have been segregated, and,
second, that the receiver has acquired the augmented fund or the segre-
gated assets.5
State court decisions upon the priority of claims against the assets
of banks which have collected items and failed before remitting the
proceeds have varied widely. In some states the strict rule which applies
to national banks has also prevailed in respect to state banks.6 In other
states the owner of an item sent for collection has been granted a pref-
erence, even where the obligor pays the item with a 'check drawn upon
his account in the collecting bank.7
112 U. S. C. A. §194 (1927) ; "From time to time, after full provision has been
made for refunding to the United States any deficiency in redeeming the notes of
such association, the comptroller may make a ratable dividend of the money so
-paid over to him by such receiver on all such claims as may have been proved to
his satisfaction or adjudicated in a court of competent jurisdiction, and, as the
proceeds of the assets of such association are paid over to him, shall make further
dividends on all claims previously proved or adjudicated; and the remainder of
the proceeds, if any, shall be paid over to the shareholders of such association, or
their legal representatives, in proportion to the stock by them respectively held."
2 Capital National Bank v. First National Bank of Cadiz, 172 U. S. 425, 19
Sup. Ct. 202, 43 L. ed. 502 (1929) ; Bartlof v. Millett, 22 F. (2d) 538 (C. C. A. 8th,
1927) ; Fiman v. State of South Dakota. 29 F. (2d) 776 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928),
cert. denied, 279 U. S. 841, 49 Sup. Ct. 254, 73 L. ed. 987 (1929).
'Townsend, Constructive Trusts and Bank Collections (1930) 39 YALE L. J.
980.
1 St. Augustine Paint Co. v. McNair, 59 F. (2d) 755 (D. C. Fla. 1932) ; Gering
v. Buerstella, 118 Neb. 54, 223 N. W. 625 (1929).
'Lucas County v. Jamison, 170 Fed. 338 (C. C. Iowa, 1908); St. Augustine
Paint Co. v. McNair, 59 F. (2d) 755 (D. C. Fla. 1932) ; Note (1934) 44 YALE
L. J. 341.
'Yesner v. Commissioner of Banks, 252 Mass. 358, 148 N. E. 224 (1925);
Zimmerli v. Northern Bank & Trust Co., 111 Wash. 624, 191 Pac. 788 (1920).
Edwards v. Lewis, 98 Fla. 212, 124 So. 746 .(1929); Winkler v. Veigel, 176
Minn. 384, 223 N. W. 622 (1929).judicial treatment of collection claims upon the assets of insolvent banks is
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The American Bankers Association Bank Collection Code, drafted
in 1929 and later adopted by eighteen states,8 was designed to simplify
and make uniform the law governing check collections.9 This code
provides that the assets of an agent collecting bank shall be impressed
with a trust in favor of the owner of items sent for collection and that
such owner shall have a preferred claim upon the bank's assets if it
should fail before remittance, irrespective of whether the proceeds of
such item can be traced and identified. 10
Three recent decisions, two in the United States Supreme Court and
one in the Circuit Court of Appeals, have held such provisions in state
banking laws unconstitutional when applied to national banks, on the
ground that they conflict with the ratable distribution provision of the
National Banking Act.11
In 1934 the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws tentatively
adopted the fifth draft of a Bank Collection Act. This act provides
that when a collecting bank receives the proceeds of an item for re-
mittance, but closes before remittance is made, the proceeds will be
discussed at length in Note (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 341, where the various holdings
in regard to both state and national banks are carefully analyzed.
'Idaho; Illinois; Indiana; Kentucky; Maryland; Michigan; Missouri; Ne-
braska; New Jersey; New Mexico; New York; Oregon; Pennsylvania; South
Carolina; Washington; West Virginia; Wisconsin; Wyoming.9 FOREwORD To AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION BANK COLLECTION CODE(1929).
"Sec. 13 (3): "Where an agent collecting bank other than the drawee or
payor shall fail or be closed for business . . . , after having received in any form
the proceeds of an item or items entrusted to it for collection, but without such
item or items having been paid or remitted for by it either in money or by an
unconditional credit given on its books or on the books of any other bank which
has been requested or accepted so as to constitute such failed collecting or other
bank debtor therefor, the assets of such agent collecting bank which, has failed or
been closed for business . . . shall be impressed with, a trust in favor of the owner
or owners of stch item or items for the amount of such proceeds and such owner
or owners shall be entitled to a preferred claim upon such, assets, irrespective of
whether the fund representing such. item or items can be traced and identified as
part of such, assets or has been intermingled with or converted into other assets
of such failed bank."
'Old Company's Lehigh v. Meeker, 55 Sup. Ct. 392 (U. S. 1935); Jennings v.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 55 Sup. Ct. 394 (U. S. 1935); Spradlin v.
Royal Mfg. Co., 73 F. (2d) 776 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934). While North Carolina has
not adopted the Bankers Bank Collection Code a similar provision has been
enacted to govern the collection situation. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §218
(c) ((14)): "Liquidation of Banks: Declaration of Dividends; Order of Pref-
erence-... Provided, that when any bank, or any officer, clerk, or agent thereof,
receives 'by mail, express or othenvise, a check, bill of exchange, order to remit
note, or draft for collection, with request that remittance be made therefor, the
charging of such item to the account of the drawer, acceptor, indorser, or maker
thereof, or collecting any such item from any bank or other party, and failing to
remit therefor, or the non-payment of a check sent in payment therefor, shall
create a lien in favor of the owner of such item on the assets of such. bank making
the collection, and shall attach from the date of the charge, entry or collection of
any such funds .... "
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deemed to be held in trust.1 2 The trust feature of this act is, of course,
subject to the same constitutional objection as the corresponding pro-
visions of the Bankers Collection Code.
The obvious effect of these decisions is to seriously impair the
effectiveness of .both proposed collection laws and to further accentuate
the division of banking into two systems, national and state. It is also
an interesting speculation, since the owner of an unremitted item would
have a lien upon the assets of an insolvent state bank but not upon the
assets of a national bank, whether the courts would consider a collecting
agent negligent who sent an item to a national bank for collection and
remittance where a state bank was equally available.' 3
To remedy the present situation in the law as to national banks
Congressional action will be necessary. Three forms of action are pos-
sible. First, Congress may enact either the Bankers Bank Collection
Code or the Uniform Bank Collection Act. Second, a statute may be
adopted stating the priorities of each of the various classes of creditors
who may have claims.' 4 Third, an amendment may be made to the
National Banking Act giving priority to claims for items collected by
national banks but for which remittance was not made before in-
solvency. The third proposal is the simplest and would work less
change and disturbance in the present structure of the law relating to
Sec. 24: "When a collecting bank receives the proceeds of an item for remit-
tance, but closes before inaking remittance in the, proper form, and which, if by
draft or other remittance item, is not dishonored upon due presentment, a debtor-
creditor relation will not be deemed to exist as to the proceeds but they will be
deemed held in trust, subject to any lien or other interest the bank may have
acquired therein. Should the 'proceeds be in the form of a credit to the bank with
a correspondent or with some other bank, or should they not be identified or
otherwise traced into specific assets of the closed 'bank, they will be conclusively
presumed to be traced into its general assets, exclusive of previously acquired
'bank buildings and other real estate and any fixtures or equipment. If such
proceeds be received in the form of a draft or other remittance item which upon
due presentment is dishonored because the drawer thereof has closed, the bank will
not be deemed in receipt of proceeds for purposes of this section but will hold
the item at the disposal of its customer."
"It has been stated that if two or more courses of collection are open to a
collecting bank, one of -which may prove damaging to the payee, the bank is liable
if damage results from a selection of that course. Federal Land Bank v. Barrow,
189 N. C. 303, 309, 127 S. E. 3, 6 (1925). But it has also been held that where a
statute alleviates the strict rule that a check is -payable only in cash by authorizing
the payment of checks -by means of bank exchanges when presented by a Federal
Reserve Bank or by mail, a selection of these courses by agent collecting banks do
not render them liable for resultant losses. Braswell v. Citizens National Bank,
197 N. C. 229, 148 S. E. 236 (1929) ; Morris v. Cleve, 197 N. C. 253, 148 S. E. 256
(1929). Both cases are discussed in Note (1929) 8 N. C. L. REV. 55.
14 See the order of preference contained in the North Carolina Banking Law,
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §218 (c) ((14)). This possible course of Con-
gressional action 'was suggested by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
UNIFORm BANK CoLLcTmON AcT §24, note.
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national banks. It is therefore suggested that the National Banking
Act 15 be amended by adding the following italized proviso:
From time to time, after full provision has been made for refund-
ing to the United States any deficiency in redeeming the notes of such
association, the comptroller shall make a ratable dividend of the money
so paid over to him by such receiver on all such claims as may have been
proved to his satisfaction or adjudicated in a court of competent juris-
diction, and, as the proceeds of the assets of such association are paid
over to him, shall make further dividends on all claims previously
proved or adjudicated; provided, that when, prior to its closing, such
banking association had received an item or items for collection and re-
mittance and had collected the proceeds thereof in any manner but either
had not remitted therefor or had remitted by an exchange draft which
was dishonored on due presentment because of the closing of such asso-
ciation, the amount of said item or items collected shall constitute a pre-
ferred claim on the assets of the association in the comptroller's hands
notwithstanding that the proceeds of such item or items cannot be traced
into the assets of the bank and cannot be shown to have augmented said
assets; and the remainder of the proceeds, if any, shall be paid over
to the shareholders of such association, or their legal representatives,
in proportion to the stock by them respectively held.
Such an amendment to the National Banking Act would simplify
the collection situation in respect to national banks by obviating the
difficulties of tracing and identifying a constructive trust res. It would
make uniform the check collection law as to state as well as national
banks; and it would assure the protection which the Bankers Collection
Code and the Uniform Bank Collection Act were designed to give to
both collecting banks and check owners.
However, it is possible that Congress may approve of none of these
proposed changes in the national banking laws. It was a current thought
twenty years ago that the restrictions imposed by Congress upon national
banks would leave them unable to successfully compete with state
banks, and that national banks would therefore be driven out of exist-
ence. With the creation by Congress of Federal Deposit Insurance' 6
the competitive odds appear to favor national banks. Before state
banks may enjoy the benefits of insured deposits they must submit to
national regulation. 17 Sensing the possibility of virtually making all
banks national banks through regulation, Congress may prefer to let
12 U. S. C. A. §194 (1927). 10 12 U. S. C. A. §264 (1934).
'712 U. S. C. A. §264 (e) (1934). The effect of this section is to require that
state banks join the Federal Reserve System as a prerequisite to the insurance of
their deposits.
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competition drive the nonconforming state banks out of existence and
to retain national banking laws as they presently exist.
JoHN R. JENKINs, JR.
Common Carriers--Railroads-Possibility of Changes in the
Law Due to Changed Economic Conditions.
That the law of railroads-and perhaps of other common car-
riers-is entering upon a period of metamorphosis does not seem to be
an extravagant prediction.1 Rather does it appear to be an almost in-
evitable conclusion. An unmistakable warning of that change is im-
plicit throughout the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States
in the case of Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters.2 It is not the
actual decision in the case which prompts the above prediction; it is the
discussion of Mr. Justice Brandeis.
A Tennessee statute imposes upon a railroad one-half the cost of
eliminating a grade crossing over its road, when such elimination is
ordered by the state highway commission. 3 Plaintiff railroad was or-
dered to contribute one-half the cost of an underpass at a point where
a new federal-aid highway intersected its line. It did not question the
power of the state to build the proposed highway; its power to require
the separation of grades; the appropriateness of the plan adopted for
such separation; nor the reasonableness of the cost. It conceded the
settled rule of law that, ordinarily, the state may, under its police power,
impose upon a railroad the whole cost of eliminating a grade crossing,
or such part thereof as it deems appropriate.4 It aid contend, how-
ever, that, in view of special circumstances set forth, the order, and
the statute as so applied, were so unreasonable and arbitrary as to de-
prive it of property without due process of law in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court found that, with but one
exception, the evidence fully supported every averment of fact in the
bill, and upheld plaintiff's contention. The Supreme Court of Tennessee
reversed the trial court, holding the statute constitutional upon its
face, and declining to consider the special facts relied upon by the
railroad. 5 The Supreme Court of the United States decided that the
state Court erred in refusing to consider those facts.
The Court summarizes the special facts alleged in the bill as relating
to "the revolutionary changes incident to transportation wrought in re-
1 No attempt will be made herein to predict specific changes.
'55 Sup. Ct. 486 (U. S. 1935).
'Tenn. Pub. Acts 1921, c.132; amended by Pub. Acts 1923, c.35; Pub. Acts 1925,
c.88.
'See 55 Sup. Ct. 486, 487 (U. S. 1935), and cases cited in n. 3.
'Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Baker, 167 Tenn. 470, 71 S. W. (2d) 678 (1934).
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cent years by the widespread introduction of motor vehicles; the as-
sumption by the federal government of the functions of road builder;
the resulting depletion of rail revenues; the change in the character,
the construction, and the use of highways; the change in the occa-
sion for elimination of grade crossings, in the purpose of such elimina-
tion, and in the chief beneficiaries thereof; and the change in the rel-
ative responsibility of the railroads and vehicles moving on the high-
ways as elements of danger and causes of accidents." 6 These topics,
which the Court discusses at length, relate .basically to the changed
economic condition of the railroads, with emphasis, of course, upon
those factors which may have contributed to that change, and which
are relevant to the particular issue presented.
If, then, problems in railroad law must be viewed in the light of
the present economic condition of the railroads, it may not be amiss
to consider some aspects of that condition. The railroads are no longer
the business and financial giants of two decades ago. They are fighting
for their very existence, and in that fight, they are weighed down by
the burdens imposed upon them in a bygone-and, for them, happier-
age. Perhaps the most graphic commentary upon the present condi-
tion of the railroads is the news that nearly eighty of them are now in
receivership, bankruptcy, or in the process of reorganization under the
recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Act.7 These eighty roads op-
erate approximately one-fifth of the total railroad mileage in the coun-
try.8 Furthermore, roads operating 67 per cent of the total mileage,
and with an aggregate capitalization of more than $2,500,000,000, were
in default at the end of 1934.9 This picture is set out in bolder re-
lief by the knowledge that it exists, in spite of the fact that, up to the
end of February of this year, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
had loaned over $450,000,000 to railroads ;1o the Railroad Credit Cor-
poration made loans of over $73,500,000 during the fifteen months end-
ing May 31, 1933; and the Public Works Administration had, up to
0 55 Sup. Ct. 486, 489 (U. S. 1935).
7 MOODY, RAILROADS (1934) a 11, a 124; id. (1935) 708.
The amendments of the Bankruptcy Act referred to are to be found in §77,
11 U. S. C. A. §205 (1934 Supp.).
'According to the WORLD ALMANAC (1935) 327, total mileage owned in 1933
was 245,703. The roads referred to in the text operate nearly 50,000 miles. MOODY,
RAILROADS (1934) a 11, a 124.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that total mileage owned has been
dropping off steadily since the 1916 high of 254,037. WORLD ALMANAC (1935) 327.
For a discussion of the extent, character, and causes of abandonments, see
MOULTON, Az EIcA. TRANSPORTATION PROBLEm (1933) 147-52.
'WORLD ALMANAC (1935) 84.
10MOODY, RAILROADS (1935) 721. The same agency has authorized an addi-
tional $7,600,000, approximately, in loans to railroads, which had not, at that time,
been disbursed.
NOTES AND COMMENTS -
August 1, 1934, disbursed $86,400,000 of the $190,950,500 allotted to
railroads."
The depression is not alone responsible for these conditions. It
served only to accelerate the operation of forces which were at work
before 1929. The railroads were in a very strong financial position in
the period roughly from 1906 to 1913. From 1910 to 1920 a progressive
weakness was evident. For the portion of this period from 1916 on,
the main explanation of the weakness lies in the failure of rates during
the war period to follow the upward movement of prices and wages.
From 1921 to 1929 there was a recovery, which, while substantial, did
not restore the strength of the period ending in 1913.12 The decline
beginning in 1930 has, of course, 'been sharp.13 But passenger service
petition of motor vehicles. 14 And although the volume of freight traffic
"MOODY, RAiLROADS (1934) a 41-3. According to more recent figures, the
railroads have received loans of $200,000,000 from the Public Works Administra-
tion. WoRLD ALMANAC (1935) 84.
'These are substantially the conclusions reached by Dr. Moulton after a
study of the financial trend of the railroads during the period 1890-1929. MOULTON,
op. cit., supra note 8, 26-48. Dr. Moulton's study includes the analysis of numerous
indices of financial condition, such as, operating ratio (ratio of operating expendi-
ture to operating revenue), ratio of income to expense, relationship between in-
come available for capital and the investment, and relationship between net in-
come and the equity of the stockholders in the property, separately, and then as
compared with one another. He supplements this aspect of the study by an in-
vestigation of the railroads' ability to raise capital during the period.
u The most important reaction of the railroad business to the depression is
reflected in the volume of business. Net ton miles of revenue freight handled
by Class I roads dropped from 433 billion in 1928 to 383 billion in 1930, and
to 309 billion in 1931. The latter figure was slightly below the low record of
1921 and far lower than that of any other year in the post-war period. The first
eleven months of 1932 showed a further drop of 25 per cent below the figure for
the corresponding period in 1931.
The decline in passenger service was even more pronounced. Revenue
passenger mileage of Class I roads decreased in 1931 13 per cent below the 1928
figure, and in 1931 20 per cent below the 1930 figure. There was a further loss
of 23.5 per cent in the first eleven months of 1932. MouLToN, op. cit., supra note
8, 49-50.
Unfortunately, no figures for these indices have been found which bring the
picture up to date. However, it does appear that the number of passengers car-
ried showed a further decline in 1933, while the number of tons of freight carried
increased slightly. This was reflected by a decline in passenger revenue, and a
slight increase in freight revenue. However, both revenue per ton mile, and per
passenger mile decreased. WORLD ALMANAC (1935) 327.
The figures for 1934 are even farther removed from the original indices; they
will serve, however, to convey a general idea of the trend. Gross operating rev-
enues for the first ten months of 1934 showed a gain of 6.3 per cent over the
same 1933 period. 'However, the gain was more than absorbed by the restoration
of the wage deduction and higher prices for fuel, materials, and supplies resulting
from the application of codes under the National Recovery Act. The result was
a decrease of 1.9 per cent below 1933 in net operating income. Passenger revenues
showed the first increase in 1934 since 1923. This latter change reflects the
roads' intensive effort to reclaim passenger business through reduced and special
fares and special equipment. WORLD ALMANAC (1935) 84.
had been dropping off since 1920, chiefly because of the increased com-
" As early as 1918, automobiles replaced the railways as the most important
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was still increasing up to 1929, the rate of increase was much lower than
before the war, and the railroads' percentage of the total volume of traf-
fic was falling.15 Thus the decline in railway traffic since 1929 reflects
in part a decrease in the total volume of transportation work being
done, in part a diversion to other agencies which would have taker/
place even under prosperity conditions, and in part the increased severity
of the competition of these other agencies under depression conditions.10
This decline in volume of traffic has been reflected in a marked
decline in gross operating revenues, 17 rates having changed but lit-
tle.' Operating expenses have been elastic enough to keep pace with
the reduction in operating revenues to some extent,19 but in contrast
with that elasticity, taxes and fixed charges have remained relatively
rigid.20 The result appears in the fact that net earnings dropped off
sharply after 1929,21 and in 1932, 150 railroads showed an aggregate
net deficit of over $150,000,000, followed by a similar deficit of nearly
$14,000,000 in 1933.22 This inelasticity of taxes and fixed charges in-
troduces another problem stressed by the Court in the principal case.
'agency for passenger traffic. MO LTONT, op. cit., supra note 8, 15, 17, 51, 86-98.
Compare tables WoRLD ALMANAC (1935) 327. See also last two sentences in note
13 supra.
' Mo wL N, op. cit., supra note 8, 18, 51.
"Ibid.
Gross operating revenues have declined steadily from $6,508,678,781 in 1926
to $3,138,185,942 in 1933. WORLD ALMANAC (1935) 328. See also the last para-
graph of note 13 supra.
As to Class I roads, the 33 per cent decline in gross operating revenues from
1928 to 1931 was the joint result of a 30 per cent drop in freight revenue, a 40
per cent drop in passenger revenue, a 45 per cent drop in express revenue, a 25 per
cent drop in miscellaneous revenue, and a trifling increase in mail revenue.
MOULTON, op. cit., supra note 8, 57.
MOULTO N, op. cit., supra note 8, 53-6.
The ratio of operating expense to operating revenue shows that revenue
shrank more rapidly than expense, but not to the extent which might be antici-
pated. The ratio varied as follows: 1929, 71.85%; 1930, 74.56%; 1931, 77.10%;
1932, 77.06%; 1933, 72.82%; 1934 (first ten months), 74.32%. WORLD ALMANAC
(1935) 328, 84. For a more detailed discussion of the factors involved, see MOUL-
TON, op. cit., supra note 8, 57-61.
1 See MOULTON, op. cit., supra note 8, 61; WORLD ALMANAC (1935) 328. Fed-
eral taxes are not of the kind to create the railroad tax problem, although they
have amounted to substantial sums during the past 20 years. They are largely
taxes which vary in proportion to the roads' ability to pay, and have never
amounted to more than one-fourth of the taxes paid by Class I roads. During
the depression, they have been reduced to only about 3.5 per cent of the taxes
imposed upon railroads.
It is the state and local taxes which are the principal factor in the railroad
tax problem. They constitute well over three-fourths of the railroads' tax bur-
den, and are relatively inflexible in the face of changes in business conditions. Ex-
•cept for 1915, this group of taxes increased every year from 1912 to 1930 inclusive,
and after the increase in 1930, decreased only $14,000,000 below the 1929 level of
$306,565,000 in 1931. See MOULTON, op. cit., supra note 8, 231-72.
1 MooDY, RAILROADS (1934) a 7.
2Ibid.
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Mr. Justice Brandeis forcefully points out2 3 that plaintiff railroad
was paying nearly 28 per cent of its gross revenues for state and local
taxes and the cost of maintaining the roadway acquired and constructed
at its own expense. In contrast, motor carriers, which have contributed
appreciably by their competition to the present plight of the rail-
roads, pay not more than 7 per cent of their gross revenues in state
and local taxes,2 4 and operate upon a roadway supplied by the state.
Whether or not railroads are, too heavily taxed is one problem, and one
which has provoked severe criticism of tax policies.2 0 But another
problem, quite as important to the railroads and to the public, is
whether or not motor carriers should be subsidized by the state to the
extent of having their roadways furnished, and still be taxed at only
the same, or perhaps a lower, rate than that imposed upon the rail-
roads with which they are in competition. Furthermore, it is not im-
possible that a portion of the fixed charges now borne by the railroads
is attributable directly, or indirectly through refunding issues, to out-
lay for the acquisition and construction of roadways. Seemingly there
is no justification for such a policy of governmental favoritism. Our
transportation system is capable of paying its own way. The process
of selecting those agencies which can serve the public most efficiently
and most cheaply should be conducted on the basis of equal oppor-
tunity. Therefore, plain justice would seem to require that motor car-
riers, competing with other transportation agencies, should be required
to pay in taxes, not only a percentage equal to that imposed upon their
competitors, but if the competitors have to acquire, construct, and main-
tain their own roadways, while the carriers operate upon governmentally
built highways, an additional percentage which will equalize the burden
cast upon the respective types of agency.20
55 Sup. Ct. 486, 494 (U. S. 1935).
The figures used by the Court here relate specifically to the plaintiff rail-
road, and presumably to motor carriers in Tennessee. Unfortunately, no figures for
a general comparison have been found.
See, for example, McDermott, The Over-Taxation of the Railroads (1928)
116 BANKERS MAG. 329, in which the author depends upon such graphic facts as
that the railroads pay over $1,000,000 a day in taxes, and that the New York
Central Lines pay the revenues from one-fourth of their total mileage in the form
of taxes. Compare MOULTON, op. cit., supra note 8, 231-72.
'Compare REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION COmMITTEE (1933).
The Report reads (I) : "Government policies should be freed of any purpose either
to favor or to handicap any form of transportation with relation to any other
form." At I (b), it reads: "Government has a positive duty to see to it that
neither the railroads nor their competitors are either unduly handicapped or
unduly advantaged.. . . In a fair field and no favor, economic competition must
decide the question of survival under private ownership and operation." Again,
at I (5), we find: "Automotive transportation should be put under such regula-
tion as is necessary for public protection. It should bear its fair burden of tax
but only on a basis of compensation for public expenditure on its behalf, plus its
share of the general tax load."
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A current complaint against the railroads condemns their practices
as wasteful, inefficient, and without foresight. The charge may be,
to some extent, justified; certainly it is not so well founded as to ex-
plain altogether the predicament in which the railroads now find them-
selves. The war left the railroads in such weak financial condition
that the period since 1920 has been one of struggle for greater effi-
ciency. Just how effective that struggle has been is probably not fully
realized by the public. That it has been of considerable influence is
not to be doubted. 27 But the results have been purchased at a cost-
a cost mounting to over a billion dollars for the year 1923, representing
the investment for additions and betterments to existing lines.28 That
is not to say that the railroads have done all that could be done to pro-
mote efficiency.2 9 But it should be borne in mind that improvements
leading to increased efficiency in railroad operations are expensive, and
that, in view of the present impecuniousness of the railroads, not too
much is to be expected of them.3 0
Probably no one doubts the economic importance of an efficient
transportation system. Very few will admit any doubt as to the es-
sential part played by the railroads in the American system.81 The
problem, then, is to put the system into its strongest and most efficient
position. This requires a preservation of the railroads. 8 2  That this
result cannot be accomplished alone by a change of business policies
of, and in respect to, the railroads is clear. Many of the changes must
come from the co6peration and application of the law, both by way of
statutory enactment and judicial decision. In this respect, the law
cannot remain a bare abstraction-the major premise upon which cases
are decided. A statute cannot be satisfactory "upon its face." The
abstractions of railroad and other law were induced by the applica-
^T See MouLsox, op. cit., supra note 8, 99-111.
'Id. at 101. The amount spent for additions and betterments dropped off to
$314,674,000 in 1931.
Both the National Transportation Committee and Dr. Moulton have sugges-
tions as to methods for increasing efficiency, within the several roads as units in
-the system, and within the system as a whole. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION CO MmIrrr (1933), and MouLTOx, op. cit., supra note 8, part
VIII.
"' See MouI.ToN, op. cit., supra note 8, 778, where he says, "During the next
few years it is improbable... that the necessary capital can be obtained to effect
significant operating improvements-and in any event the most obvious types
of improvements have already been effected."
"In spite of the inroads made by competing agencies upon the business of the
railroads, the ton mileage on the railways in 1929, for example, was roughly two
and one-half times that on all other forms of agency combined. In 1930, the
capital invested in railroads was greater than that represented by the country-wide
system of highways. As to the relative importance of the various transportation
agencies, see MouLToN, op. cit., supra note 8, 14-18.
The opening sentence of the REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION COAs-
wITTrxs (1933) reads: "The railroad system must be preserved."
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tion of policies in view of then existing facts. Now the Supreme
Court of the United States announces that the law must be tested by
the application of policies upon present facts. If it does not meet the
test, it must be replaced. The decision in the principal case is an en-
lightened one.
D. W. MARKHAM.
Conflict of Laws--Forum's Use of the Construction
Given a Foreign Statute by a Third State.
Plaintiff, a gratuitous guest in defendant's automobile, was injured
in an accident occurring in South Carolina. Suit was brought in
Georgia, and the South Carolina "guest statute" was pleaded as the
basis of recovery. The complaint, which relied on the host'sunlawful
speed, failure to equip the car with a suitable steering apparatus, opera-
tion of the car with knowledge of its defective condition, and inatten-
tion while driving, was held demurrable as failing to show that the
accident was "intentional on part of the owner or operator or caused by
his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the rights of others" so as
to permit recovery under the statute.2
In attempting to apply the rule of lex loci,3 the Georgia court, as the
forum, found it necessary to find the meaning of the terms "heedless-
ness or reckless disregard" as used in the South Carolina statute in
order to construe and apply that statute to the facts alleged in the
complaint. 4
The statutes of a foreign jurisdiction are generally given the same
construction by the courts of the forum as that given by the courts of
last resort in the foreign state.5 But the statute in question here had
never been construed by the South Carolina court. In view of this fact,
the forum considered the Connecticut court's construction of the Con-
necticut "guest statute" on the presumption that South Carolina in
adopting a statute verbally the same adopted it in view of previous
Connecticut constructions. This presumption is supported by reason
I S. C. CODE (1932) §5908. This statute, passed in 1930, changed the common
law rule of ordinary negligence to require intent or heedlessness or reckless dis-
regard on the part of the owner or driver before his gratuitous guest could claim
a right of action against him. See notes 8 and 20, infra.
'Lee v. Lott, 177 S. E. 92 (Ga. App. 1934).
'White v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 14 Ga. App. 139, 80 S. E. 667 (1914) ; Wise
v. Hollowell, 205 N. C. 286, 171 S. E. 82 (1933); GOODRIc H, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1927) §92; RFSTATMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §§411X, 413.
'Lee v. Lott, 177 S. E. 92, 94 (Ga. App. 1934).
'Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Turner, 188 Ark. 177, 65 S. W. (2d) 1 (1933);
Georgia, Fla. & Ala. R. Co. v. Sasser, 4 Ga. App. 276, 61 S. E. 505 (1908) ; White
v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 14 Ga. App. 139, 80 S. E. 667 (1914).
'Conn. Pub. Acts 1927, c. 308.
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and authority 7 and affords the forum a practical means of approximat-
ing the law of the foreign state. However, the forum did not content
itself with an examination of Connecticut decisions but also considered
Georgia and South Carolina rulings on degrees of negligence and willful
misconduct.
8
In view of the cases examined, the forum seems amply justified in
sustaining the demurrer.9 But suppose the Georgia definitions had
been so different from those of Connecticut that if followed a different
result would have obtained.1 0 Would the forum, having presumed the
lex loci to be the same as the law of Connecticut, feel inescapably bound
by this "foreign law" to the exclusion of its own? The question in-
volves more than the old difficulties of defining degrees of culpable
conduct, for an adequate answer necessitates a choice between two
conflicting views of the bases of conflict of laws.
The Restatement adopts the "vested rights" or "obligatio" theory
of foreign created rights.'" According to this view, the only source
of the tort obligation is the lex loci and therefore that alone must de-
termine the existence and the extent of the obligation.' 2 This limits,
"Fuller v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 128 S. C. 14, 121 S. E. 478 (1924);
Shiveley's Adm'r. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 125 Va. 384, 99 S. E. 650 (1919).
'Lee v. Lott, 177 S. E. 92, 94 (Ga. App. 1934). Under the Conn. decisions
"heedlessness or reckless disregard" was construed as "heedless and reckless dis-
regard." Bordonaro v. Senk, 109 Conn. 428, 147 At. 136, 137 (1929). And
"wanton misconduct" is equivalent to "reckless disregard." Menzie v. Kalmono-
witz, 107 Conn. 197, 139 Atl. 698, 699 (1928). The examination of the Georgia
and South Carolina cases -was to further define "wanton misconduct" and "reck-
lessness."
Georgia has no "guest statute" but follows the "Mass. rule" (Massaletti v.
Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N. E. 168 [1917]) of "gross negligence." Epps v.
Parrish, 26 Ga. App. 399, 108 S. E. 297 (1923).
' Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 143 Atl. 240 (1928) ; Bordonaro v. Senk, 109
Conn. 428, 147 Atl. 136, 137 (1929) ; Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Moore, 5 Ga. App.
562, 63 S. E. 642, 644 (1909) ; Buffington v. Atlanta, Birmingham & Coast R. Co.
47 Ga. App. 85, 169 S. E. 756, 757 (1933); Hull v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. 76
S. C. 278, 57 S. E. 28 (1907).
"o The forum will not enforce a foreign statute if penal or if violative of the
public policy of the forum. Southern Rwy. v. Decker, 5 Ga. App. 21, 62 S. E.
678 (1908). No constitutional provision expressly prohibits the forum from
wholly disregarding the foreign facts and foreign law, though the due process
clause has been applied as a limitation on legislative power in such cases as
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 427, 41 L. ed. 832 (1897). See,
in this regard, Stumberg, Conflict of Laws, Foreign Created Rights (1930) 8 Trx.
L. REv. 173; note (1935) 13 N. C. L. Rav. 213. The Restatement enters a caveat
here: RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §45. But see Cardozo, J., in
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N. Y., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198, 202 (1918).
u REsTATEmFNT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §43; Slater v. Mexican National
Rwy., 194 U. S. 120, 24 Sup. Ct. 581, 48 L. ed. 900 (1904); Western Union v.
Brown, 234 U. S. 542, 124 Sup. Ct. 955, 58 L. ed. 1457 (1914); Loucks v. Standard
Oil Co. of N. Y., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918) ; BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1916) 106; GOODRI H, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) 10; Stumberg, Conflict of
Laws, Torts, Texas Decisions (1930) 9 Tax. L. Rav. 26.
'GoODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) §94. See Western Union v. Brown;
Slater v. Mexican National Rwy.; Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., all supra note 11.
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by implication at least, the power of the forum to do more than recog-
nize and enforce a "foreign created right," the leax fori being material
only as setting a policy beyond which the obligation will not be enforced
there.1 3
A contrary view, as expressed by Cook, Lorenzen and others,
14
holds that there is nothing fundamental in the application of foreign
law and that, in fact, the plaintiff's right is always determined by the
leax fori which "imposes an obligation of its own as nearly homologous
as possible to that arising in the place where the tort occurred."1 5
Under this view the effect of the foreign law as a factor in the case
"depends on ideas of expediency, policy, and fairness at the forum and
not upon a hypothesis of power abroad to create rights."'
6
Since, in the last analysis, the forum must determine the rights of
the parties before it, whatever legal rules and principles it chooses as a
model for its decree, should not the approach to conflict of laws prob-
lems be from this pragmatic basis rather than from an a priori assump-
tion of "foreign created rights"? Only by such an approach is ref-
erence possible to all the circumstances that might have a bearing on
reaching the best result.1
7
The "foreign created rights" view as a valid and controlling prin-
ciple is challenged by the Georgia court's holding that if the liability of
the defendant had been of common law rather than of statutory origin,
the lex fori rather than the lea loci would have controlled.' 8  Also if
the forum should consider the degree of negligence required to impose
liability under the leax loci inconsistent with the policy of the forum, it
might enforce a "right" different in scope from that of a "right" under
the decisions of the foreign court, and this could not then be accurately
called a "foreign right."'19  Even if a forum nominally adopts the lex
Cuba R. Co. v. Crosby, 222 U. S. 478, 32 Sup. Ct. 132; 56 L. ed. 274 (1911).
Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, (1924) 33 YALE
L. 3. 457; Cook, Recognition of Mass. Rights by N. Y. Courts (1918) 28 YALE
L. J. 67; Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws (1924)
33 YALE L. J. 736; Stumberg, loc. cit. supra note 11; Stumberg, loc. cit. supra
note 10.
' Learned Hand, J., in Guinness v. Miller, 291 Fed. 769, 770 (S. D. N. Y.
1923).
Stumberg, supra note 10, at 174; Stumberg, supra note 11, at 21, n. 1.
17 Stumberg, supra note 10, at 194.
'Hall v. Slaton, 168 Ga. 710, 148 S. E. 741 (1929) reversing 38 Ga. App. 619,
144 S. E. 827 (1928) (plaintiff suing for injury occurring in Alabama where
ordinary negligence permits guest's recovery, is held to Georgia's'requirement of
gross negligence.) This is not the prevailing view, however: Askowith v. Massell,
260 Mass. 165, 156 N. E. 875 (1927) ; Wise v. Hollowell, 205 N. C. 286, 171 S. E.
82 (1933) but see note 20 infra; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) §413 X.
"Cook, Tort Liability and Conflict of Laws (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 202.
Similarly, where damages are being assessed and estimated the rule of the forum
may be applied. Georgia, F. & A. Ry. Co. v. Sasser 4 Ga. App. 276, 61 S. E. 505
(1908) ; Dorr Cattle Co. v. Des Moines Nat'l Bank, 127 Iowa 153, 98 N. W. 918,
922 (1904) ; Note (1932) 24 A. L. R. 1268.
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loci as controlling, it may accept only the terminology of the foreign
law and look to its own decisions for substantive definitions.20
Among the American decisions, 2 1 the results reached and the lan-
guage employed seem to support the .'vested rights" theory, but on
closer examination, particularly of contract cases, it is evident that
rulings have been shaped with a view to the result desired and without
any real basic theory common to all the cases. 22 It is submitted that
the hypothesis of the "vested rights" theory of conflict of laws does not
accurately describe the legal phenomena with which it treats and that it
involves limitations on the power of the forum which make it impractical
and undesirable as a binding rule for the guidance of the courts.23
R. MAYNE ALBRIGHT.
Constitutional Law-Police Power-Price Control of Milk.
The New York Milk Control Act prohibited the sale within the
state of milk purchased -from producers in other states at a price less
than the minimum payable to producers within the state.' Plaintiff
dealer in New York City purchased milk from producers in Vermont at
prices below the minimum fixed -by the Act, and sold it in New York
both in the original containers and in bottles. Plaintiff was denied a
dealer's license because he refused to comply with the provisions of the
Act and the regulations thereunder. After being threatened with prose-
cution for trading without a license, plaintiff sued to enjoin enforcement
of the Act. A District Court of three judges granted an injunction
against the enforcement of the Act as to sales in the original cans but
denied relief as to sales in bottles after removal from the cans.2 On
' Wise v. Hollowell, 205 N. C. 286, 171 S. E. 82 (1933) (N. C. accepted the
Virginia common law rule of "gross negligence" but applied its own definitions to
the terms). See a criticism in (1934) 12 N. C. L. REv. 247. For a criticism of
the N. C. rule of ordinary negligence, see Brogden, J., dissenting in Norfleet v.
Hall, 204 N .C. 573, 169 S. E. 143 (1933). For a proposed statute for N. C., see
(1930) 9 N. C. L. REv. 47.
1 England does not recognize the "vested rights" theory in tort cases but re-
quires the foreign wrong to be such as would have been actionable if committed
in England. Phillips v. Eyre, L. R. 6 Q. B. 1 (Ex. 1870).
' Stumberg, sitpra note 10, at 184, 186.
' Lorenzen, mspra note 14, at 751.
1 New York Agriculture and Markets Law, Laws 1934, c. 126, 258m (4),
article 21-A; formerly Laws 1933, c. 158, 312 (g), article 25 ("It is the intent of
the legislature that the instant, whenever that may be, that the handling within the
state by a milk dealer of milk produced outside of the state becomes a subject of
regulation 'by the state, in the exercise of its -police powers, the restrictions set
forth in this article respecting such milk so produced shall apply and the powers
'conferred by this article shall attach. After any such milk so produced shall
have come to rest within the state, any sale, within the state by a licensed dealer
or a milk dealer required by this article to be licensed, of any such milk purchased
from the producer at a price lower than that required to be paid for milk produced
within the state purchased under similar conditions, shall be unlawful.")
'Seelig v. Baldwin, 7 F. Supp. 776 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
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appeal, the Supreme Court held an injunction should issue as to all
the milk brought in, whether sold in the original packages or in bottles,
because the Act had the "aim and effect of establishing an economic
barrier against competition with the products of another state" and was
"an unreasonable clog upon the mobility of commerce." 3
It was established in Nebbia v. New York4 that a state could fix
milk prices to be paid the producer, the wholesaler, and the retailer.
The Supreme Court did not base its decision on the existence of an
emergency in the industry, and neither did it resort to the old doctrine
that the business "was affected with a public interest ;" it held that price
control, like any other regulation, "is unconstitutional only if arbitrary,
discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature
is free to adopt." Thus the prospect of saving the dairy industry from
bankruptcy and of assuring New York an ample supply of wholesome
milk necessary to its public health appeared very bright until the prin-
cipal case was decided. In this latter case the court was of the opinion
that the purpose of the legislation was to restrict competition from out-
side the state. Though it may not appear on the face of the Act, the
real concern and the underlying purpose of the legislation was to assure
the people of New York a sufficient quantity of milk, whether it be
produced within or without the state. To accomplish this purpose the
Act simply attempted to give the producers outside of New York the
same protection accorded the local producers. The system of price con-
trol approval in the Nebbia Case is bound to fail now that the Commerce
Clause has been invoked to deny protection to the producers outside the
regulating state. Forthwith the dealers will begin purchasing outside
the state at lower prices in order to increase their profits. The New
York producers will have to cut prices in an effort to regain lost
business; this will result in an orgy of unbridled competition the con-
Seelig v. Baldwin, 55 Sup. Ct. 497 (1935).
"291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. ed. 940 (1934). This decision was con-
cerned with an intrastate situation and did not touch on the -problem involved in
the principal case. In approving the New York Milk Control plan the court
declared, at page 538, that if the legislature "concludes that the conditions or
practices in an industry make unrestricted competition an inadequate safeguard
of the consumer's interest, produce waste harmful to the public, threatened ulti-
mately to cut off the supply of a commodity needed by the public, or portend the
destruction of the industry itself, appropriate statutes passed in an honest effort
to correct the threatened consequences may not be set aside because the regulation
adopted fixes prices reasonably deemed by the legislature to be fair to those en-
gaged in the industry and to the consuming public. And this is especially so
where, as here, the economic maladjustment is one of price, which threatens harm
to the producer at one end of the series and the consumer at the other." And
again, at page 537, the court stated, "So far as requirement of due process is con-
cerned, and in the absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to
adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public
welfare, and to enforce that legislation adopted to its purpose."
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sequences of which will be a bankrupt industry, a failure of the milk
supply from without as well as from within the state, and injury to
public health. 5
It is imperative that some means 'be devised to preserve a constant
supply of milk and this depends upon saving the producers from eco-
nomic ruin. It is possible that New York might accomplish this end
by imposing a sales tax upon the milk dealers equal to the differential
between the price actually paid the producer, whether he be in Vermont
or New York, and the minimum price fixed by law. Such a tax would
apply to all milk whether sold in the original package or not.0 There
would be no discrimination against the out of state producer since the
dealer selling imported milk would pay the same tax required of the
dealer in domestic milk who failed to pay the minimum price.1 Some
'At the time the principal case was tried New York received thirty percent of
its milk from outside the state. The statute controlling prices will fall short of
its goal when even this percentage of the producers have no protection. It is only
natural that the dealers should buy outside the state to increase their profits. The
result of this is that the producers outside the state who supply New York will
greatly increase in number and will compete with each other to force the price
down. The New York producers will not find a market for their milk when the
imported milk may be sold for less than the minimum fixed price. New York
will be forced to abandon her present price control system and this will result in
ruinous competition between the increased number of producers supplying New
York from outside the state and the local producers. The producer received only
two cents per quart for milk before the legislature determined to fix minimum
-prices in order to prevent destruction of the industry and to safeguard the con-
sumers. Unless some control measure is sustained, prices will drop below the old
figure and the producers without as well as within New York will be bankrupt.
'Sonneborn Brothers v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506, 43 Sup. Ct. 643, 67 L. ed.
1095 (1923). The original -package doctrine was first applied in Brown v. Mary-
land, 25 U. S. 419, 6 L. ed. 679 (1827) and it was held that the foreign imports
could not be taxed by the states so long as they remained in the hands of the
importer and in the original package. It was implied in that early case that
domestic imports could not be taxed so long as they remained in the original
package 'but this obiter has 'been overruled by later cases. Infra note 7.7 Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U. S. 123. 19 L. ed. 382 (1868) (The defendant
auctioneer was engaged in selling goods brought in from another state in the
original package, as well as local goods. The court held that a tax which did not
discriminate against sales of goods from other states, and which was imposed
upon sales of all merchandise, whether the origin of the goods was in the local
state or in another state, was not "an attempt to fetter commerce among the
States," and that it was applicable to the goods sold in the original package).
Hinson v. Lott, 75 U. S. 148, 191 L. ed. 387 (1868) (Alabama law imposed a
levy of fifty cents per gallon before it should be lawful for a dealer to introduce
liquor into the state for sale. This was held not an attempt to burden interstate
commerce because by another section of the same law every distiller in the state
was bound to -pay fifty cents per gallon. The two sections were complementary
in order to "make the tax equal on all liquors sold in the State.")
The 'possible objection that such a tax would burden interstate commerce seems
to be discredited in Sonneborn Brothers v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506, 43 Sup. Ct.
643, 67 L. ed. 1095 (1923). A tax on the sale of oil in the original package was
sustained. In considering the rule followed in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100,
10 Sup. Ct. 681, 31 L. ed. 128 (1890) as to the necessity of sale to complete im-
portation to sustain the view that the sale was a part of interstate commerce, the
court pointed out the radical difference between state legislation preventing any
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practical objections to such a plan suggest themselves at once: there
would be difficulty in establishing the differential between the price
actually paid the producer and the fixed minimum price for the purpose
of measuring the tax on the individual transaction, also purchasers in
the original container could easily avoid the tax by making the purchase
outside the state and having the milk shipped direct to them instead of
purchasing from the local dealer who has brought it into the state.8
Thus it seems that the state acting alone cannot effectively legislate to
assure itself of an ample supply of milk.
If the holding in Hammwr v. Daggenhart9 is followed, it is doubtful
that Congress could control the price of milk by excluding it from inter-
state commerce when the producer was not paid the minimum price.
Perhaps there can be no effective control unless Congress can be pre-
vailed upon to divest milk of its interstate character as it has done in
the cases of intoxicating liquors,1 0 oleomargarine,'1 and convict-made
goods,' 2 so that the laws of the state may apply when the milk is
shipped into the *state for sale and use therein.
THOMAs H. LEATH.
sale at all accompanied by forfeiture of the merchandise, and a provision for
an occupational tax applicable to all sales of such merchandise whether domestic
or brought in from another state. It was, determined that the first clearly inter-
feres with or destroys the commerce, while the second merely puts the merchandise
on an equality with all the other and is no hindrance to introducing the merchan-
dise into the state for sale upon the basis of equal competition.
" In such a situation the sale would take place in the producing state and the
receiving state would have no sale to tax.
'247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62 L. ed. 1101 (1918). This case held un-
constitutional the effort of Congress to regulate the hours of labor of children by
means of a prohibition against the movement in interstate commerce of ordinary
commercial commodities which they helped to produce. This -was held to be an
attempt to regulate an intrastate matter which was outside the power of Congress.
'An attempt on the part of Congress to fix the price of milk by refusing to allow it
to be shipped in interstate commerce on the ground that the producer did not
receive the minimum price seems closely analogous and would likely be held
unconstitutional.
The federal courts are divided over the validity of the federal control over
milk prices established under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 48 STAT. 31-41
(1933), 7 U. S. C. A. §§601-19 (1934 Supp.). The statute was approved in the
following cases: Economy Dairy Co. v. Wallace, (Leading Decisions, IX-N. R. A.)
(Sup. D. C. 1933) (This case held that the statute was applicable even though the
milk did not cross a state line) ; Capital City Milk Producers' Assn. v. Wallace,
(Leading Decisions, IX-N. R_ A.) (Sup. D. C. 1933) ; United States v. Shissler,
7 F. Supp. 123 (N. D. Ill. 1934); United States v. Dwyer, (Leading Decisions
IX-N. R. A.) (D. C. Mass. 1934). The statute was held invalid in Edgewater
Dairy Co. v. Wallace, 7 F. Supp. 121 (N. D. Ill. 1934). It was held in the follow-
ing cases that the statute did not apply where the milk vas not in interstate com-
merce, Mellwood Dairy Co. v. Sparks, (Leading Decisions IX-N. R. A.) (W. D.
Ky. 1934); Royal Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Wallace, 9 F. Supp. 975 (D. C. D. Md.
1934).
"
0The Wilson Act, 26 STAT. 313 (1890), 27 U. S. C. A. §121 (1928); The
Webb-Kenyon Act, 37 STAT. 699 (1913), 27 U. S. C. A. §122 (1928).
"32 STAT. 193 (1902), 21 U. S. C. A. §25 (1927).
=The Hawes-Cooper Act, 45 STAT. 1084 (1929), 49 U. S. C. A. §65 (1934
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Contracts-Insane Persons' Transactions in North Carolina.
Controversies concerning the status of deeds and contracts made by
insane persons have caused the courts perennial difficulty. Conflicts which
arise between a desire to protect lunatics on one hand and innocent per-
sons dealing with them on the other, and also between the rule that
intent to be bound is necessary to form a contract and the rule that
no person may stultify himself by his own plea' have caused much con-
tradiction among the authorities.2  The purpose of this note is to
consider the North Carolina decisions relating to these transactions.
Because a "meeting of the minds" is of the essence of a contract, it
has been said in this state that at law the contract of a person non
compos mentis is void and an action for damages for non-performance
will fail.3 Although this is good authority as to entirely executory
contracts, when there has been partial or complete performance the rule
is not followed. When this is the case the insane person is treated as
seeking rescission in equity and relief is granted on the basis of con-
structive fraud.4
This theory throws on the alleged lunatic the 'burden of proving
insanity; but only a preponderance of the evidence is required.5 The
Supp.) This statute did not go into effect until 1934 and the Supreme Court has
not yet passed upon its validity. One of the main purposes of this legislation
was to prevent the competition of cheap prison-made goods with the goods
produced "by free labor.
I This rule is not recognized in North Carolina. Craddock v. Brinkley, 177
N. C. 125, 98 S. E. 280 (1919).
'Such deeds are variously said to be void, as in Hood v. Holligan, 158 So. 759
(Ala. 1935); absolutely voidable, as in Brewster v. Weston, 235 Mass. 14, 126
N. E. 271 (1920) ; and voidable only on certain conditions, as in England. Im-
perial Loan Co., Ltd. v. Stone, [1892] 1 Q. B. 599. The general holdings are
thoroughly covered by Note (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 504. The English law is
discussed at length in Cook, Mental Deficiency and the Englis/h Law of Contract
(1921) 21 CoL. L. RFv. 424.
'Carr v. Holliday, 21 N. C. 344 (1836); Cameron-Barkley Co. v. Thornton
Light & Power Co., 138 N. C. 365, 50 S. E. 695 (1905).
' Wadford v. Gillette, 193 N. C. 413, 137 S. E. 314 (1927) ; Searcy v. Hammett,
202 N. C. 42, 161 S. E. 733 (1931). This rule does not apply to contracts of mar-
riage which are by statute void unless there is birth of issue. N. C. CoDE ANN.
(Michie, 1931) §2495. However, a proceeding to set aside a marriage for this
cause is a proceeding to dissolve the marriage bonds and alimony may be awarded
pendente lite. Lea v. Lea, 104 N. C. 603, 10 S. E. 488 (1889). But cohabitation
after recovery will not cure the defect. Sims v. Sims, 121 N. C. 297, 28 S. E. 407
(1897).
rLamb v. Perry, 169 N. C. 436, 86 S. E. 179 (1915). While it is true that only
a preponderance of the evidence and not "clear, strong, and convincing proof" is
required, there is a "natural presumption" of sanity which must be overcome by
the .preponderance. Jones v. Winstead, 186 N. C. 536, 120 S. E. 89 (1923). Men-
tal incapacity may 'be shown by non-expert witnesses. 'Hodges v. Wilson, 165
N. C. 323 81 S. E. 340 (1914). A finding of insanity by an inquisition for that
purpose raises a presumption of fact that such is the case, and is to be admitted
as such a finding and not as the opinion of twelve good men and true. Arrington
v. Short, 10 N. C. 71 (1824) ; Armstrong v. Short, 8 N. C. 11 (1820). But the
finding is not binding and may be rebutted. Parker v. Davis, 53 N. C. 460 (1862).
NOTES AND COMMENTS 505
cases approve two charges as a measure of mental capacity: 1. Did the
party know what he was about? 2. Did the party realize the nature
and scope of his acts? Either of these is sufficient, but both may be
used.( If the evidence satisfies this test the insane person is entitled to
relief." This statement is, however, subject to an exception based on a
policy of protecting innocent persons who have dealt with lunatics; but
a party relying on this has the burden of establishing certain conditions
which the court has laid down as prerequisite to sustaining the contract
or deed of an insane person.8
The exact scope of these conditions is somewhat in doubt. An early
case sets them out thus: That the other party must have acted (1) in
good faith, (2) without knowledge of the incapacity, (3) without taking
advantage of the lunatic, (4) for a full consideration, (5) which man-
ifestly went for the benefit of the insane person.9 A later case in a
similar list omits the last of these, but adds another, that the person -non
compos inentis be unable to restore the status quo.10 The most recent
North Carolina decision in point apparently not only disregards the
requirement of benefit to the lunatic, but also that the consideration
must be full. 1 There are dicta, but, so far as a thorough search re-
vealed, no direct holdings, to the effect that the contracts and deeds of a
person adjudicated insane are void and not voidable only, hence this
exception does not apply to such cases.12
'Cameron-Barkley Co. v. Thornton Light & Power Co., 138 N. C. 365, 50 S. E.
695 (1905). The same tests apply to cases of extreme drunkenness. Burch v.
Scott, 168 N. C. 602, 84 S. E. 1035 (1915).7 Goodwin v. Parker, 152 N. C. 672, 68 S. E. 208 (1910). Since the basis of
setting aside deeds in this state is fraud, a subsequent bona fide purchaser without
notice is protected. Adam v. Riddick, 104 N. C. 515, 10 S. E. 609 (1889). Hence,
it is a fraud for one who has knowingly dealt with a lunatic to convey any property
which he has obtained to another and the proceeds of such sale may be traced as
a trust. Sprinkle v. Wellborn, 140 N. C. 163, 52 S. E. 666 (1905).
'Riggan v. Green, 80 N. C. 237 (1879); Ipock v. Atl. & N. C. Ry. Co., 158
N. C. 445, 74 S. E. 352 (1912).
'Riggan v. Green, 80 N. C. 237 (1879).
1 0Wadford v. Gillette, 193 N. C. 413, 137 S. E. 314 (1927).
u Searcy v. Hammett, 202 N. C. 42, 161 S. E. 733 (1931) (Suit by payee on
defendant's endorsement of an extension note by a corporation of which he was a
stockholder. Defendant was insane at the time and the only benefit which he
received was the extension of time on the debt of the corporation. A judgment
for the defendant was reversed. The court said that there was consideration for
the note. Thus, although the holding may be regarded as merely that the note
was ordinarily enforceable, it would seem unnecessary to send the case back unless
there was also enough benefit to the lunatic to meet the requirement. But this
extension can hardly be said to have been a full consideration manifestly to the
benefit of the insane person.)
" Ipock v. Atl. & N. C. Ry. Co., 158 N. C. 445, 74 S. E. 352 (1912) ; Wadford
v. Gillette, 193 N. C. 413, 137 S. E. 314 (1927).
Contracts as to necessities are enforced on a theory of implied contract and
are not really an exception to the general rule. Thus a person who furnishes
money at the request of one not an agent or guardian of the insane may recover.
Surles v. Pipkin, 69 N. C. 513 (1873).
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The lunatic's privilege to rescind is not, however, an absolute one.
He must tender back any benefit which he has received,' 8 or at least
the court has within its discretion the power to require him to do so.14
Another class of cases in which fraud is presumed must be distin-
guished. In these, the showing is not total incompetency, but only men-
tal -weakness. In order to raise a presumption of fraud under such
proof it is necessary to demonstrate some further "inequitable incidents
-such as undue influence, great ignorance, want of advice, and in-
adequate consideration."' 15 The fraud presumed from these circum-
stances is fraud in fact and may be rebutted by any evidence. Accord-
ingly, it would seem that "presumption" here means "enough evidence
to go to the jury on an issue of fraud. ' u 6
The trend of the cases seems to be away from the earlier rule of
according high protection to insane persons in their business dealings
and toward a policy of protecting those who in good faith trade with
them. Particularly is this true in the cases involving the title to land.
The question essentially resolves itself into a choice between throwing
a loss on one of two innocent parties. A frank recognition of this
problem by the courts would perhaps bring about a more satisfactory
result in particular cases than the present a priori rules.
PETER HAIRSTON.
Insurance-Misrepiesentation-Effect of Agent's Knowledge of
Falsity of Statements in Application for Policy.
In an action on an insurance policy it appeared that insured had
stated in his application for reinstatement of the policy that he was in
good health, when as a matter of fact he had diabetes. Both insured
and the agent who wrote the policy knew this. The trial court charged
that in the absence of fraud or collusion between the agent and insured,
the agent's knowledge would be imputed to the company. The jury
found for the plaintiff. Held, judgment affirmed.'
Perhaps the clearest type of situation calling for the application of
the doctrine stated by the trial judge in this case is found when the
policy provides that it shall be void if certain facts are present, and the
agent has full knowledge of the presence of such facts. Thus, where
" West v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 151 N. C. 231, 65 S. E. 979 (1909).
"' lpock v. Atl. & N. C. Ry. Co., 158 N. C. 445, 74 S. E. 352 (1912).
'Smith v. Beatty, 37 N. C. 456 (1843) ; Dixon v. Green, 178 N. C. 205, 100
S. E. 262 (1919).
16 Suttles v. Hay, 41 N. C. 124 (1848). The issue submitted to the jury in these
cases is not mental competency, but fraud. Dixon v. Green, 178 N. C. 205, 100
S. E. 262 (1919).
"Colson v. State Mutual Assurance Co., 207 N. C. 581, 178 S. E. 211 (1935).
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the agent knew that a building sought to be insured stood on leased
ground but assured the owner that this was an immaterial circumstance,
it was properly held that the agent's knowledge would be imputed to the
company, and that the company would then be estopped to assert the
breach of the condition in the policy as a defense. 2 If the agent knows
of a circumstance prohibited by the policy, but nothing is said between
him and insured on the subject, the North Carolina decisions still hold
that the same doctrine applies. 3 This holding is sound; if the company
delivers a policy knowing, through the knowledge of its agent, of a
circumstance which by the terms of the policy makes it void, then to
permit the company to assert the circumstance as a defense would be to
permit it to sell a policy which it knew to be void.
However, may it be argued against the position of the court as- above
described that the insured is under a duty to read his policy, and that
if he does, he will discover the violated provision, and should be obliged
to have the policy corrected? In a case presenting different facts our
court has held that one who can read will not be heard to say that he
was ignorant of the contents of his policy in the absence of fraud or
mistake.4 The court's position, however, was rendered uncertain by a
later decision in which it appeared that the agent had induced insured
not to read his policy. 5 There it was said, "It is unnecessary to deter-
mine the interesting question whether, if plaintiff had not thus been
misled by the agent . . . his omission to read could be imputed to him
as negligence which would exonerate the company." No reference was
'Bergeron v. Pamlico Ins. & Banking Co., 111 N. C. 45, 15 S. E. 883 (1892);
cf. National Life Ins. Co. v. Grady, 185 N. C. 348, 117 S. E. 289 (1923).
'The rule has been applied where the agent knew the status of the ownership
of the property: Grabbs v. Farmers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 125 N. C. 389, 34 S. E.
503 (1899) ; Aldridge v. Greensboro Fire Ins. Co., 194 N. C. 683, 140 S. E. 706
(1927); Hauck v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 198 N. C. 303, 151 S. E. 628(1930); where he knew a building was still under construction and therefore
uninsurable: Johnson v. Rhode Island Ins. Co., 172 N. C. 142, 90 S. E. 124
(1916) ; where he knew the "iron safe clause" would be violated: Bullard v. Pilot
Fire Ins. Co., 189 N. C. 34, 126 S. E. 179 (1924) ; where he knew that dynamite
was kept on the premises: Midkiff v. N. C. Home Ins. Co., 197 N. C. 139, 1.47
S. E. 812 (1929); Midkiff v. Palmetto Fire Ins. Co., 198 N. C. 568, 152 S. E.
792 (1930) ; and where he knew that other insurance was carried on the property:
Laughinghouse v. Great National Ins. Co., 200 N. C. 434, 157 S. E. 131 (1931).
But if the agent has an interest in the insured property, notice to him will not be
imputed to the company: Roper v. National Fire Ins. Co., 161 N. C. 151, 76 S. E.
869 (1912) ; nor does the doctrine apply where the agent gains his knowledge
after the inception of the policy: Green v. Aetna Ins. Co., 196 N. C. 335, 145 S. E.
616 (1928). A member of a fraternal order knowing of the restrictions on its
agents' powers will not 'be allowed to invoke the doctrine: Robinson v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineers, 170 N. C. 545, 87 S. E. 537 (1915).
Cuthbertson v. N. C. Home Ins. Co., 96 N. C. 480, 2 S. E. 258 (1889) ; cf.
Weddington v. Piedmont Fire Ins. Co., 141 N. C. 234, 54 S. E. 271 (1906).
'Collins v. U. S. Casualty Co., 172 N. C. 543, 90 S. E. 585 (1916). This seems
to be the only case involving notice to the agent in which the question of insured's
duty to read his policy has been raised.
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made to the former decisions in this state, but cases supporting both
sides were cited from other jurisdictions.
A second type of case in which this doctrine of imputed notice is
applied is where in his application the insured makes a misrepresenta-
tion in good faith, but the agent is aware that the statement made is
false. For example where insured stated that he bad no bodily infirmity
when in fact he was partially deaf, it appearing that he did not consider
deafness a bodily infirmity, it was held that he could recover upon show-
ing that the agent of defendant company knew of the deafness.0  Here
again the equities are in favor of insured, and it would be unjust to
refuse a recovery.
In a third type of case in which both agent and insured know of the
falsity of the representation the doctrine has been applied on the basis
of a jury finding that there has been no fraud or collusion.7 Such is
the situation in the instant case. But how can a jury say that one who
has knowingly signed his name to a false statement, thus procuring
insurance which otherwise he could not have obtained, is not guilty of
a fraud? It is submitted that in these cases the fact that both agent and
insured knew of the falsity of the representation is in itself fraud and
collusion sufficient to exonerate the company from liability. This view
is supported by authority in other jurisdictions.8
Finally there may be a question as to the materiality of the misrepre-
sentation made. In the instant case it is said, "We see no error in the
exclusion of the opinion of this doctor as to whether a person who has
diabetes has an insurable risk. It was immaterial to the controversy-
it may not be amiss to say that the evidence is to the effect that Colson
did not die of diabetes, but another cause wholly apart from this dis-
ease." If by this it is meant to say that a misrepresentation concerning
a matter not contributing to loss under the policy will not be regarded
as material, it is submitted that the ruling is contra to the previous
Follette v. U. S. Mutual Accident Ass'n, 107 N. C. 240, 12 S. E. 370 (1890)
(judgment for defendant reversed); same case in 110 N. C. 377, 14 S. E. 923
(1892) (judgment for plaintiff affirmed) ; cf. Fishblate v. Fidelity Co., 140 N. C.
589, 53 S. E. 354 (1906); Short v. Lafayette Life Ins. Co., 194 N. C. 649, 140
S. E. 302 (1927).
' Gardner v. North State Mutual Life Ins. Co., 163 N. C. 367, 79 S. E. 806
(1913); Marsh v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 199 N. C. 341, 154 S. E. 313 (1930).
But where there was strong evidence of a conspiracy between insured, agent, and
the examining physician, it was error to charge that notice to the agent was notice
to the company: Sprinkle v. Knights Templar Indemnity Co., 124 N. C. 405, 32
S. E. 734 (1899) ; judgment for defendant affirmed in 126 N. 0. 678, 36 S. E. 112
(1900).
'Triple Link Mutual Indemnity Ass'n. v. Williams, 121 Ala. 138, 26 So. 19
(1899); Globe Res. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Duffy, 76 Md. 293, 25 Atl. 227 (1892);
Mudge v. Supreme Court, I. 0. F., 149 Mich. 467, 112 N. W. 1130 (1907); News-
holme Brothers v. Road Transport Ins. Co. (1929] 2 K. B. 356; Rocco v. North-
western National Ins. Co., 64 Ont. L. Rep. 559 (1929).
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North Carolina cases on the subject.9 The cases heretofore have held
that the important factor in determining the materiality of a representa-
tion is whether it is one that would have influenced the company in
deciding the important questions of accepting the risk and fixing the
premium rate.
FRANKLIN T. DUPREE, JR.
JMortgages-Corporations---Removal of Trustees under
Security Deeds of Trust.
The defendant was named as trustee in a Georgia real estate mort-
gage securing a number of bonds. Thereafter the holders of ninety-two
per cent of these bonds filed a petition in the Georgia court praying the
defendant's removal from the trusteeship on the grounds that he was
insolvent, that he had misappropriated trust funds committed to his
care, that he had been convicted of a fraudulent breach of trust, and
that for other reasons he was not a suitable person to act as trustee.
Service was by publication. The lower court ruled that the action was
properly brought. Held, by the Georgia Supreme Court, that the action
should have been dismissed, since, inter alia, the proceeding was in
personam, and service by publication was insufficient to give the court
jurisdiction.'
Contrary to a proposition advanced by the court in its opinion,2 it
has been quite generally conceded that, even in the absence of statutory
authority,3 the equity court's inherent supervisory power over all trusts
includes the power, in a proper case, to remoye an unfit mortgage trus-
tee.4 In the situation which is perhaps most analagous in so far as the
'Fishblate v. Fidelity Co., 140 N. C. 589, 53 S. E. 354 (1906) ; Gardner v.
North State Mutual Life Ins. Co., 163 N. C. 367, 79 S. E. 806 (1913).
'Caldwell v. Hill, 176 S. E. 381 (Ga. 1934).
2176 S. E. at 382-385.
2 Quite commonly statutes now -provide a procedure for the removal of trus-
tees. The grounds for removal are also stated in many. For example, KAN. REv.
STAT. (1923) Ch. 67-412: "Trustees having violated or attempting to violate any
express trust, or becoming insolvent, or of whose solvency or that of their sureties
there is reasonable doubt, or for other cause, in the discretion of the court having
jurisdiction, may, on petition of any person interested, after hearing, be removed
by such court; and all such vacancies in express trusteeships may be filled by such
court." These provisions are applicable to mortgage trusteeships. Sanders v.
Hall, 74 F. (2d) 399 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934). The North Carolina statute, N. C.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §2583 (a), provides for removal by vote of a majority
of the note or -bondholders, -when the trustee has removed from the state, become
a bankrupt, or, if corporate, ceased to do business, etc. This provision, however,
is expressly stated to be "in addition to the rights and remedies now -provided by
law." §2583, as amended, Public Laws 1933, c. 493, provides for a proceeding
before the clerk for the appointment of a successor where the trustee has absented
himself or become otherwise incompetent.
'4 TiompsoN, CORPORATIONS (3rd ed. 1927) §2667. On the removal of trustees
generally see 1 PERRY, TRUSTS (6th ed. 1911) §275 et seq.
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point here considered is concerned, i.e., the trusteeship under the usual
corporate mortgage, 5 this proposition has rarely been brought to ques-
tion. The court, though reluctant6 to alter a situation which the parties
by their contract have created, will, nevertheless, remove a mortgage
trustee when, in the exercise of a sound discretion, this expedient is
necessary to a proper administration of the trust. A mere innocent
'breach of duty, however, though subjecting the trustee to liability for
the damage caused thereby, will not justify his removal in the absence
of evidence that such a course will result in some substantial benefit to
the estate. 7 It must be shown that the trustee has become an incom-
petent person to execute the trust, either because of some personal dis-
ability, or because he has placed himself in a position antagonistic to the
interests of the bondholders whom he represents. Insolvency,8 perma-
nent absence from the state,0 collusion with the mortgagor,' 0 willful
breach of duty,": refusal to execute the trust upon proper demand be-
Though the mortgagor was an individual in this case, the situation presented
is comparable to that of the corporate mortgage in that the indenture was executed
to secure an issue of coupon bonds rather than, as is the usual case with an indi-
vidual's mortgage, one or a few promissory notes. Consequently the cases con-
sidered herein deal, in the main, with corporate mortgages.
6 "It is generally a difficult thing to induce a court to remove a trustee. A court
of equity has the power to do so, but will not regularly use that power." 4 CooK,
CoxpoaATioNs (8th ed. 1923) §819.
'Matthews v. Murchison, 17 Fed. 760 (C. C. E. D. N. C. 1883). In Connover
v. Guarantee Trust Co., 88 N. J. Eq. 450, 102 Atl. 844 (1918), the indenture pro-
vided that the bonds 'were to be secured by mortgages assigned and transferred
to the trustee by the issuing corporation. The trustee accepted the corporation's
own mortgages executed to itself. This was held to be beyond the authority of
the trustee, consequently it was liable to the bondholders for any damages which
might accrue, but the court refused to remove the trustee. There was no bad
faith on its part, and "the trustee is a responsible banking institution .... The
removal of a trustee is a matter directed to the sound discretion of a court; in
the absence of bad faith upon the part of a trustee, he should not be removed
unless some benefits to the trust can be accomplished by such removal."
'Insolvency does not ipso facto terminate the trust. Sanders v. Hall, 74 F.(2d) 399 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934) ; Mitchell v. Shuford, 200 N. C. 321, 156 S. E. 513
(1930). But it has long been recognized as a ground for removal, whether the
trustee be an individual or a corporation. Iowa & Cal. Land Co. v. Hoag, 132 Cal.
627, 64 Pac. 1073 (1901) ; Reynolds v. New York Security & T. Co., 88 Hun 569,
34 N. Y. S. 890 (1895), aff'd, 157 N. Y. 689, 51 N. E. 1092 (1898) ; Clay v. Shela
Valley Irr. Co., 14 Wash. 543, 45 Pac. 141 (1896). This is usually contained in
the statutes providing for removal of trustees, see note 3 supra. If the trustee
is no more than a bare stakeholder for the security, with no active duties to per-
form, the court in its discretion might properly refuse to remove him upon the
grounds of insolvency alone.
'Ketchum v.'Mobile & 0. R. Co., 2 Woods 532, Fed. Cas. No. 7, 737 (C. C.
S. D. Ala. 1876); 3 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) §2296; cf. Ettlinger v.
Schumacher, 142 N. Y. 189, 36 N. E. 1055 (1894) (holder of corporate bonds per-
mitted to foreclose when trustee beyond the jurisdiction and unobtainable) ; Wash-
ington Etc. R. R. Co. v. Alexandria Etc. R. R. Co., 19 Gratt. 592, 100 Am. Dec.
710 (Va. 1870).
10 Matter of Mechanics' Bank, 2 Barb. 446 (N. Y. Supreme Ct. 1848).
"' North Carolina R. R. Co. v. Wilson, 81 N. C. 223 (1879) (trustee lent sink-
ing fund money to a banking firm of 'which he was a member in violation of the
provisions of the indenture).
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ing made,' 2 or any other fact showing the trustee to be incompetent will
suffice. As this relief may be preventative as well as remedial, the
trustee should be removed where he has placed himself in such a posi-
tion that future injury may accrue to the trust therefrom. Thus where,
at the time of foreclosure, the same party occupies the trusteeship
under both prior and junior mortgages, he should be displaced from
one or the other to obviate future embarrassment which may result from
conflicts between the interests which he represents. 13 "Public policy
requires, where controversies are brought into court, that each party
should be represented by someone whose single object it is to secure all
to which such party is entitled, unhampered by personal relations to an
adverse party. ' '14
A method of removal and substitution of trustees is frequently pro-
vided in the mortgage itself. Though the parties by their contract may
not entirely deprive the court of its jurisdiction in this regard,15 these
provisions are generally upheld,16 and an appointment made in com-
pliance therewith will not be disturbed by the court except to correct
some obvious abuse.17 Thus where the power of removal and substi-
tution is given to the majority of the bondholders under a corporate
"Harrison v. Union Trust Co., 144 N. Y. 326, 39 N. E. 353 (1895) (removal
granted where trustee refused to convey property when ordered to do so by fore-
closure decree).
' Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 70 Fed. 423 (S. D. N. Y.
1895) ; Northampton Trust Co. v. Northampton Traction Co., 270 Pa. 199, 112 Atl.
871 (1921). Contra: Clyde v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 55 Fed. 445 (C. C. E. D.
Va. 1893) (trustee held under twelve different mortgages on the same railroad
system; bondholders committee was denied the right to intervene in foreclosure
proceedings in the absence of a positive showing of negligence or inability to
represent their interests upon the part of the trustee).
"
4Kephart, J., in Northampton Trust Co. v. Northampton Traction Co., 270
Pa. 199, 112 Atl. 871, 872 (1921). Some of the decisions, however, have displayed
a reluctance to remove the trustee or to allow intervention by bondholders merely
because of some mutual interest existing between trustee and mortgagor, majority
bondholders committee, etc. Bowling Green Trust Co. v. Virginia Passenger &
Power Co., 132 Fed. 921 (C. C. E. D. Va. 1904) (trustee corporation and mort-
gagor corporation controlled by the same group); Continental & C. Trust & S.
Bank v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 200 Fed. 600 (E. D. Wis. 1912) (trustee "co perat-
ing" with a combination to reorganize the mortgagor company) ; Fidelity Trust
Co. v. Washington-Oregon Corp., 217 Fed. 588 (W. D. Wash. 1914) (trustee's
position as depositary for bonds under reorganization agreement not grounds for
removal) ; McPherson v. Commercial Bldg. & Securities Co., 206 Iowa 562, 218
N. W. 306 (1928) (trustee indirectly interested in protection of directors of
mortgagor and will not proceed as "aggressively" as would bondholder).
Cf. Wright v. Pitts, 62 App. D. C. 217, 66 F. (2d) 197 (1933).
s' JONES, 10c. cit. supra note 9. Cf. Fletcher v. Rutland & B. R. Co., 39 Vt. 633
(1858) (statute, passed after the execution of the mortgage, which in effect
nullified power of appointment was in violation of the contract clause of the
United States Constitution) ; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Hughes, 11 Hun 130(N. Y. Supreme Ct. 1877) (former trustee enjoined from bringing actions as
trustee after removal).
I However, the court will be very reluctant to disregard the method .provided.
Dillaway v. Boston Gaslight Co., 174 Mass. 80, 54 N. E. 359 (1899).
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mortgage, the motives for its exercise cannot be questioned so long as
no abuse of trust to the detriment of minority bondholders appears;
with this limitation, the decision of the majority as to the adequacy of
the reasons for removal is conclusive.' 8 However, a strict construction
is always accorded these provisions.19 Any failure to comply with the
stipulated formalities is likely to prove fatal. 20 But it is unnecessary to
follow the statutory procedure, where one exists, since the trustee is
replaced under the contract of the parties rather than through the ordi-
nary legal machinery.21 Likewise, the appointee will succeed to the
trusteeship without any formal conveyance from his predecessor. 22
Where the mortgage was executed by an individual, some of the earlier
cases have shown a tendency to weaken the effect of the power of
appointment by construing it as personal to the creditor named in the
indenture. It has been held that it is neither assignable with the debt,2 3
nor delegatable to an agent.2 4 But even where this view has been
adopted the more recent cases show a tendency to construe the instru-
ment so as to avoid its application,2 5 and no such limitations are placed
upon the power when granted to the holders of bonds secured by a
corporate mortgage.26
Removal pursuant to such mortgage provision may be accomplished
without notice to interested persons, even though court approval be the
final step required. The parties by their contract have provided the
remedy, thus rendering the customary legal formalities unnecessary. 27
But where no such provision is found in the mortgage, there must be
some jurisdictional basis for the court to take action in the matter.
Either all the parties concerned must be joined in the litigation, or the
property involved must have been brought within the ambit of the
court's control. In the former case the action is in personam. Mort-
"March v. Romare, 116 Fed. 355 (C. C. A. 5th, 1902).
' TuomPsoN, op. cit. spra note 4, §2668.
'The attempted substitution was held ineffectual in the following cases.
Speers Sand & Clay Works, Inc. v. American Trust Co., 37 F. (2d) 572 (C. C. A.
4th, 1930) ; Griffin v. Haden, 172 Ga. 478, 157 S. E. 686 (1931) ; Equitable Trust
Co. v. Fisher, 106 Ill. 189 (1883) ; James v. James, 260 Mass. 19, 156 N. E. 745
(1927). But cf. Balfour-Guthrie Inv. Co. v. Woodworth, 124 Cal. 169, 56 Pac.
891 (1899) (method of proof of appointment of successor trustee provided in the
mortgage not exclusive) ; Underhill v. Whitney, 88 Colo. 608, 299 Pac. 12 (1931)
(court refused to allow collateral attack by one who was a stranger to the trust).
Raleigh Real Estate & Trust Co. v. Padgett, 194 N. C. 727, 140 S. E. 714(1927).
- Craft v. Indianapolis, D. & W. Ry. Co., 166 Ill. 580, 46 N. E. 1132 (1897).
Clark v. Wilson, 53 Miss. 119 (1876).
' Watson v. Perkins, 88 Miss. 64, 40 So. 643 (1906). Contra: Michael v.
Crawford, 150 S. W. 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
West v. Union Naval Stores Co., 117 Miss. 153, 77 So. 961 (1918).
'City Bank & Trust Co. v. Graf, 175 Ga. 340, 165 S. E. 238 (1932).
' Macon & Agusta R. Co. v. Georgia R. Co., 63 Ga. 103 (1879) ; Pillsbury v.
Consolidated E. & N. A. Ry. Co., 69 Me. 394 (1879).
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gagor, trustee, and bondholders, or their representatives, are necessary
parties.28 Here the court has power over the person of the trustee to
compel a transfer by him of his interest in the entire res to his successor.
Where a part of the security is real property located in another juris-
diction the conveyance will be recognized in the courts of its situs. It
is not the decree of the removing court which is being effectuated but
the act of the parties which, though perhaps under judicial duress, is
none the less valid.2 9 But if the trustee be not found within the state,
the court must obtain jurisdiction over the property before it may divest
the trustee of his interest therein. The decree will be in rem, and can-
not operate upon property beyond the state line.30 Once this jurisdic-
tion over the property is acquired, interested parties not otherwise ob-
tainable may be served by publication. 31 Where the trustee's interest
in the security is dubbed "legal title," or "lien," there is little doubt but
that he can be served by publication. However, the situation presented
to the Georgia court is more perplexing. Under the rule prevailing in
that state the trustee has no more than a mere power or agency in regard
to the property, while the legal title to the security is in the 'bond-
holders.32 On this basis it was held that there was nothing before the
'Hidden v. Washington-Oregon Corp., 217 Fed. 303 (W. D. Wash. 1914) ;
Inhabitants of Anson v. Somerset R. Co., 85 Me. 79, 26 Atl. 891 (1892) ; Cory v.
Clmstead, 154 Tenn. 513, 290 S. W. 31 (1926).
' Smith v. Davis, 90 Cal. 25, 27 Pac. 26 (1891) ; Poindexter v. Burwell, 82 Va.
507 (1886) ("The doctrine is that if the person to do the act decreed is within
the jurisdiction of the court, and the act may be done without the exercise of any
authority operating territorially within the foreign jurisdiction, the court may act
in personam, and oblige the party to 'convey, or otherwise to comply with its
decree.") ; Penn v. Lord Baltimore 1 Ves. Sr. 444 (Ch. 1750) ; Beale, Equitable
Interests in Foreign Property (1907 20 HARv. f. REV. 382. It has been held that
a court may appoint a receiver and decree foreclosure though the property lies
beyond its jurisdiction. Paget v. Ede, L. R. 18 Eq. 118 (1874). Likewise the
court of one state can order foreclosure of a mortgage upon a railroad which
extends through several states. Craft v. Indianapolis, D. & W. Ry. Co., 166 Ill.
580, 46 N. E. 1132 (1897) ; Union Trust Co. v. Olmsted, 102 N. Y. 729, 7 N. E.
822 (1882). But here again it is the conveyance of the parties which is recog-
nized by a foreign court. The decree cannot per se have an extraterritorial effect.
Lynde v. Columbus, C. & I. C. Ry. Co., 57 Fed. 993 (C. C. D. Ind. 1893). Statutes
commonly provide that the court's decree may in certain cases operate as a con-
veyance. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §607. The degree, however, cannot
have the effect of transferring property beyond the jurisdiction of the court 'which
renders it. This must be done by compelling the parties to execute a conveyance.
4 PomER0Y, EQUITY JURIsPRUDENcE (4th ed. 1919) §§1317, 1318.
"Parker v. Kelley, 166 Fed. 968 (C. C. W. D. N. Y. 1908); cf. Lindsley v.
O'Reilly, 50 N. J. L. 636, 15 Atl. 379 (1888).
" Ketchum v. Mobile & 0. R. Co., 2 Woods 532, Fed. Cas. No. 7,737 (C. C. S. D.
Ala. 1876) (trustee served by publication) : State Nat. Bank v. Syndicate Co. of
Eureka Springs, Ark., 178 Fed. 359 (W. D. Ark. 1910) (nonresident bondholders
may be served by publication); Marshall v. Kraak, 23 App. D. C. 129 (1904)
(removal valid even without service by publication where trustee had left the
jurisdiction). But cf. Washington Etc. R. R. Co. v. Alexandria Etc. R. R. Co., 19
Gratt. 592, 100 Am. Dec. 710 (Va. 1870).
1 See the court's discussion 176 S. E. 384-385.
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court upon which service by publication could be predicated, despite the
fact that the security was Georgia realty. This conclusion is not
altogether without support,3 3 and it follows logically from the premise
if we permit our deductions to lead us through the esoteric technicalities
with which the field of mortgage law is replete. But in this respect
there is no empirical difference between trustees of Georgia and of
North Carolina real estate. In the last analysis what the trustee does
have, whether it be legal title, lien, power, or whatnot, is intimately
associated with the property conveyed as security. The court's control
over the latter should form a basis for publication of service. Mere
names should not alter the situation. Otherwise substantial interests of
bondholders may sometimes be sacrificed for the preservation of this
legal will-o'-the-wisp that is the trustee's interest, an interest that exists
only for the protection of the bondholders, and serious difficulties might
arise should the trustee choose to absent himself at a time when his
services are most necessary.3 4
JOEL B. ADAMS.
Trial Practice-Power of Court to Increase Damages as
Condition to Denial of Motion for New Trial.
A jury in a federal district court awarded the plaintiff $500 damages
for personal injuries caused by the defendant's negligence. On the
plaintiff's motion a new trial was ordered because of inadequacy of
damages unless the defendant consented to increase the verdict to $1500.
The defendant consenting, the motion for new trial was automatically
denied, and the plaintiff appealed to the circuit court of appeals where
the trial court's action was reversed.' Defendant obtained certiorari in
the Supreme Court, which divided five to four in upholding the action
of the intermediate appellate court.2
Mr. Justice Sutherland, writing the majority opinion, said that the
imposition of such a condition on the denial of a motion for a new trial
violated the plaintiff's right to jury trial, as guaranteed by the Seventh
Amendment. He traced the historical development in early English
mayhem cases of the procedure followed by the trial court in this case,
but concluded that those cases had been overruled and were not the
common law at the time the Constitution was adopted. The converse
'Cf. Sanders v. Hall, 74 F. (2d) 399 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934).
" Ordinarily a trustee must obtain court approval in order to free himself from
the trust if he chooses to resign. Under the doctrine of the principal casc, the
Tennessee court would have authority to approve such resignation, since the sit us
of the trust is within its jurisdiction. Cf. Sanders v. Hall, 74 F. (2d) 399 (C. C.
A. 10th, 1934).
1 Schiedt v. Dimick, 70 F. (2d) 558 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934).
- Dimick v. Schiedt, 55 Sup. Ct. 296 (U. S. 1935).
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procedure of allowing a plaintiff to make a remittitur when a verdict is
excessive in lieu of granting the defendant a new trial was criticized
by the majority as being based on poor authority and illogical reasoning.
This practice of remittitur was said to be too well settled to be disturbed
and, "is not without plausible support in the view that what remains is
included in the (jury's) verdict along with the unlawful excess ...
But where the verdict is too small, an increase by the court is a bald
addition of something which in no sense can be said to be included in
the verdict."
Mr. Justice Stone, speaking for the minority, relied upon two prin-
cipal grounds in support of the trial judge's order. First, it is logically
inconsistent and practically inexpedient to permit the use of remittitur
when damages are excessive and to deny the addition of damages in
cases of inadequacy. Second, a trial court's exercise of judicial discre-
tion in the decision of motions for new trials on the grounds of excessive
or inadequate damages is not open to review on appeal. This opinion
points out many procedures which were unknown to the common law
and yet are firmly embedded in federal practice. 3
The court purposely refrained from any consideration of the state
court decisions, but in view of the conflict of authority, and since the
question decided in the principal case is an open one in most of the
states, it is believed that a review of these cases will not be profitless.
The great majority of the state courts hold that a new trial may be
granted by the trial judge, if, in the exercise of his sound judicial dis-
cretion, he considers the damages excessive 4 or inadequate. 5 A new
trial because of inadequate damages in actions for injury to person or
reputation, or where the damages equal the actual pecuniary loss sus-
tained by the plaintiff, is prohibited by statute in several states. 6
An overwhelming majority of the state cases, following the federal
rule, permit the trial judge to condition the denial of a defendant's
motion for a new trial because of excessive damages upon the plaintiff's
consent to a remittitur of the excess to be fixed by the judge.7 The
Dimick v. Schiedt, 55 Sup. Ct. 296, 303 (U. S. 1935). Since 1836 the federal
courts have had the power to treble damages awarded by'jury in patent cases
when the court thought that defendant should be punished. Stimpson v. The Rail-
roads, 23 Fed. Cases No. 13, 456 (C. C. 3d Cir. 1847).
'Cables v. Bristol Water Co., 86 Conn. 223, 84 Atl. 928 (1912) ; Ostrander v.
Messmer, 315 Mo. 1165, 289 S. W. 609 (1926) ; Hogg v. Plant, 145 Va. 175, 133
S. E. 759 (1926).
Anglin v. City of Columbus, 128 Ga. 469, 57 S. E. 780 (1907) ; Tathwell v.
City of Cedar Rapids, 122 Iowa 50, 97 N. W. 96 (1903) ; Brown v. Wyman, 224
Mich. 360, 195 N. W. 52 (1923).
'Note (1934) 88 A. L. R. 943.
"Edwards v. Willey, 218 Mass. 363, 105 N. E. 986 (1914) ; Herrman v. U. S.
Trust Co. of N. Y., 221 N. Y., 143, 116 N. E. 865 (1917) ; McIntyre v. Smyth, 108
Va. 736, 62 S. E. 930 (1908).
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state decisions are practically unanimous in holding that the plaintiff
must submit to a new trial, the verdict being set aside, upon his refusal
to consent to a remittitur. The defendant's consent is not necessary.8
Some cases permit the trial judge to condition the granting of a new
trial upon the payment of attorneys' fees and costs by the moving
party.9 Other conditions are occasionally attached to orders for new
trials.' 0
The procedure followed by the trial court in the principal case has
been directly upheld in four states: Illinois,"z New Jersey, 1 2 Wis-
consin, 13 and Washington. 14 In condemnation cases the practice is
allowed in California;15 and although money damages were not in-
volved, the denial of the plaintiff's motion for a new trial upon the
defendant's consent to an increased liability is allowed in Iowa.L In
Virginia, by statute,17 the trial court may raise the jury's verdict, if it
is clearly inadequate and the facts conclusively show the amount it
should be.' 8
In two states, Louisiana and Washington, the appellate court may
increase an award of damages which is inadequate, In Louisiana neither
8Note (1928) 53 A. L. R. 779.
'Brown v. Cline, 109 Cal. 156, 41 Pac. 862 (1895) ; Wooster v. Calhoun, Cir-
cuit Judge, 150 Mich, 459, 114 N. W. 232 (1907) ; Myers v. Fox, 129 App. Div. 31,
113 N. Y. S. 116 (1908); Jaquish v. Kelly, 167 App. Div. 523, 153, N. Y. S. 114
(1915); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Schmidt, 155 Wis. 242, 144 N. W. 283 (1913).
"°Dunning v. Crofutt, 81 Conn. 101, 70 Atl. 630 (1903) ; Wirsing v. Smith,
222 Pa. 8, 70 Atl. 906 (1908) ; Hall v. Northwestern R. R. Co., 81 S. C. 522, 62
S. E. 848 (1908) ; Honaker v. Shrader, 115 Va. 318, 79 S. E. 391 (1913).
Carr v. Miner, 42 Ill. 179 (1866) ; James v. Morey, 44 Ill. 352 (1867).
Gaffney v. Illingsworth, 90 N. J. Law 490, 101 Att. 243 (1917) (compare the
reasoning in this opinion with the opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in the principal
case).
' Risch v. Lawhead, 211 Wis. 653, 248 N. W. 127 (1933) (dictum that the
plaintiff may have a new trial if he refuses to take the increased verdict, implying
that the whole procedure is optional with both parties) ; cf. Gosczinski v. Carlson,
157 Wis. 551, 147 N. W. 1018 (1914); Reuter v. Hickman, Lawson, and Diener
Co., 160 Wis. 284, 151 N. W. 795 (1915); Campbell v. Sutcliff, 193 Wis. 370, 214
N. W. 374 (1927).
" Clausing v. Kershaw, 129 Wash. 67, 224 Pac. 573 (1924) ; Hillman v. City
of Seattle, 163 Wash. 401, 299 Pac. 514 (1931).
'Adamson v. Los Angeles County, 52 Cal. App. 125, 198 Pac. 52 (1921); cf.
Tabpr v. Bailey, 22 Cal. App. 617, 623, 35 Pac. 975, 979 (1913).
"' Smith v. Ellyson, 137 Iowa 391, 115 N. W. 40 (1908) (Jury found that de-
fendant must maintain half of a fence. It -was held proper for the trial court to
deny plaintiff's motion for a new trial upon condition that defendant maintain
more than half the fence).
'
7VIGINIA CoDE ANN. (Michie 1930) §6251.
'Blake Co., Inc. v. Smith & Son, Ltd., 147 Va. 960, 133 S. E. 685 (1926);
cf. Forbes v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 130 Va. 245, 108 S. E. 15 (1921). The
statute is not applicable in the federal courts sitting in Virginia, because the
Seventh Amendment would be infringed. Norton v. City Bank etc. Co., 294 Fed.
839, 843 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923). But see Schuerholz v. Roach, 58 F. (2d) 32 (C.
C. A. 4th, 1932).
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party has any option to a new trial, nor any further appeal. 19 In Wash-
ington the appellate court gives the plaintiff an option of taking the
increased verdict or a new trial.20
In two states, Georgia and Massachusetts, the cases are conflicting.
The older cases in both these states disapprove the procedure, 2 1 but a
more recent case from each state decides differently. 22 In only one
state, Michigan,23 are the cases unanimously in accord with the major-
ity decision in the principal case.
A South Carolina case inferentially supports the majority of the
state decisions ;24 while in Indiana and Missouri the authorities indicate
that the procedure would be disallowed. 25
Although the majority state rule thus permits the conditioning of a
plaintiff's motion for new trial because of inadequate damages upon the
defendant's consent to an increase of the verdict, the practice is said to
be limited to clear cases and should be sparingly used.2 6
The exact question involved in the principal case does not appear to
have been raised in North Carolina. It has been held in this state that
the trial judge may set aside a verdict and grant a new trial when he
regards the damages assessed by the jury as excessive 27 or inadequate. 28
His exercise of judicial discretion in passing upon motions for new
" Sullivan v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R. R. Co., 39 La. Ann. 800, 2 So. 586 (1887);
Caldwell v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R. R. Co., 41 La. Ann. 624, 6 So. 217 (1889).
Bingamin v. City of Seattle, 139 Wash. 68, 245 Pac. 411 (1926).
' Jones v. The Water Lot Co., 18 Ga. 539 (1855) ; Scott v. Taylor, 57 Ga. 168
(1876) ; Shanahan v. Boston & N. St. Ry. Co., 193 Mass. 412, 79 N. E. 751 (1907).
'Anderson v. Jenkins, 99 Ga. 299, 25 S. E. 648 (1896); Clark v. Henshav
Motor Co., 246 Mass. 386, 140 N. E. 593 (1923) (The court said that the jury
must not be separated before the conditional order for new trial is entered, as was
the situation in Shanahan v. Boston & N. St. Ry. Co., 193 Mass. 412, 79 N. E. 751
(1907) cited supra note 21, and the cases are distinguished on this basis) ; cf. Gor-
don v. Mitchell, 68 Ga. 11, 22 (1881).
'Lorf v. City of Detroit, 145 Mich. 265, 108 N. W. 661 (1906) ; Goldsmith v.
Detroit, J. & C. Ry., 165 Mich. 177, 130 N. W. 647 (1911). However, the Mich-
igan court permits the practise of remittitur. North Michigan Land Co. v.
Kneeland, 149 Mich. 495, 112 N. W. 1114 (1907).
24 Laney v. Bradford, 4 Rich. 1 (S. C. 1850) (held that the trial court might
impose reciprocal conditions).
' De Ford v. Urbain, 48 Ind. 219 (1874); Kortjohn v. Altenbernd, 14 Mo.
App. 342 (1883) (It was held error to order a new trial unless the defendant, for
whom the jury found a verdict, would allow judgment against him for part of the
damages claimed by the plaintiff; but if the defendant consents then the error is
not a ground for reversal on the plaintiff's appeal.)
' Carr v. Miner, 42 Ill. 179, 192 (1866) ; Risch v. Lawhead, 211 Wis. 653, 657,
248 N. W. 127, 130 (1933).
"Goodson v. Mullen, 92 N. C. 211 (1885) ; Norton v. North Carolina R. R.,
122 N. C. 910, 29 S. E. 886 (1898) ; Boney v. Atlantic & N. C. R. R., 145 N. C.
248, 58 S. E. 1082 (1907) ; Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 163 N. C. 431,
79 S. E. 690 (1913).
1 Harton V. Reavis, 4 N. C. 256 (1815) ; Benton v. Collins, 125 N. C. 83, 34
S. E. 242 (1899) ; Burns v. Asheboro etc. R. R. Co., 125 N. C. 304, 34 S. E. 495
(1899); Jarrett v. High Point Trunk & Bag Co., 142 N. C. 466, 55 S. E. 338
'(1906).
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trials upon these grounds is said to be not reviewable on appeal,29 unless
there is a gross abuse of discretion.8 0 In an early case there is a dictum
that a trial judge may not revise or correct the verdict of a jury, but is
limited to setting it aside in a proper case. 31 However, more recent
cases indicate that the judge does have the power to revise a jury's
verdict, although no case affirmatively holds that a trial judge may deny
a motion for a new trial upon condition that the non-moving party
consent to a reduction or increase in damages, according as they are
excessive or inadequate. It has been held that a trial judge may not
enter a verdict for a less amount than that found by the jury without
the plaintiff's consent.82 The compelling inference to be drawn from
this case is that if the plaintiff consented to a remittitur the court might
deny the defendant a new trial. The same implication is found in
another case.33 Three other recent cases 34 clearly indicate that the
practice of the trial judge reducing excessive verdicts upon the consent
of the plaintiff is widely followed in North Carolina. These cases are
based upon a statute35 which authorizes the trial court to set aside
excessive verdicts.
When the problem of the principal case is presented to the North
Carolina Supreme Court, it is submitted that the court will pursue a
wiser course if the majority state cases are followed. Such a result
would be logically consistent with the procedure approved in the cases
mentioned above. It would tend to accelerate the now sluggish
processes of trial and appellate practise, thereby reducing the costs of
litigation. After the jury has first determined where the liability falls,
there is no serious invasion of its functions in permitting the trial judge
to revise the amount of damages. WELCH JORDAN.
Vendor and Purchaser-Restrictive Covenant-Marketable Title.
A covenant restricting the use of real property is perhaps the most
widely used device for protecting residential districts from the inroads
of business and industrial establishments.1 While first enforced in
'See cases cited supra, notes 27 and 28.
Pender v. North State Life Insurance Co., 163 N. C. 98, 79 S. E. 293 (1913).
Shields v. Whitaker, 82 N. C. 516, 522, 523 (1880).
"Isley v. Virginia Bridge & Iron Co., 143 N. C. 51, 55 S. E. 416 (1906).
'Decker v. Norfolk & Southern R. R. Co., 167 N. C. 26, 83 S. E. 27 (1914).
- Bizzell v. Auto Tire & Equipment Co., 182 N. C. 98, 108 S. E. 439 (1921) ;
Bailey v. Dibbrell Mineral Co., 183 N. C. 525, 112 S. E. 29 (1922); Hyatt v.
McCoy, 194 N. C. 760, 138 S. E. 405 (1927).
N. C. CODE AN. (Michie 1931) §591.
The more recent development and use of zoning ordinances offers another
method of protection. For a comparison of the utility of the two methods, see
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equity against a subsequent owner of the restricted property on a theory
of prevention of unjust enrichment, 2 courts today enforce these cove-
nants upon two general theories: first, as contracts concerning land ;3
and second, as easements or servitudes on the property restricted. 4 An
objection to the first view is that it may result in creating a right where
none should exist. Thus, where an injunction against breach of the
covenant would be refused because of radical change in the character
of the neighborhood, it was still held that a vendee was justified in
refusing a deed on the grounds that the possibility of an action at law
for damages rendered the vendor's title unmarketable. 5 Though the
restriction had long been obsolete, its ghost was allowed to continue to
haunt the unfortunate realty owner.6
But the second theory has also given some difficulty. For example,
if the character of the neighborhood has so radically changed that the
property is no longer useful for residential purposes, courts quite com-
monly refuse an injunction.7 Yet under the proprietary theory this
amounts to a deprivation of property. As a way out some courts have
Van Hecke, Zoning Ordinances and Restrictions in Deeds (1928) 37 YALE L. 3.
407.
2 "Of course the price would be affected by the covenant, and nothing could be
more inequitable than that the original purchaser should be able to sell the
property the next day for a greater price, in consideration of the assignee being
allowed to escape from the liability which he had himself undertaken." Tulk v.
Moxhay, 2 Phil. 774 (Ch. 1848).
'Wiegman v. Kusel, 270 Ill. 520, 110 N. E. 884 (1915); Windemere-Grand
Improvement Ass'n v. American Bank, 205 Mich. 539, 172 N. W. 29 (1919);
Stone, The Equitable Rights and Liabilities of a Stranger to a Contracp (1918) 18
COL. L. REV. 291; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2nd ed. 1920) §396.
'Weil v. Hill, 193 Ala. 407, 69 So. 438 (1915) ; Riverbank Improvement Co. v.
'Chadwick, 228 Mass. 242, 117 N. E. 244 (1917) ; Pound, The Progress of the Law,
1918-1919; Equitable Restrictions (1919) 33 HARv. L. REV. 813.
'Bull v. Burton, 227 N. Y. 101, 124 N. E. 111 (1919) (Covenant of 1864
against use of lot on Fifth Avenue for "any stable either public or private." In
1919 the lot was worth $19,700 a foot on the Avenue. Though the restriction
would not have been enforced in equity, it was thought to be yet sufficiently alive
"at law" to make the owner's title unmarketable.) ; see Genske v. Jensen, 188 Wis.
17, 205 N. W. 548 (1925) ; cf. Postley v. Kafka, 213 App. Div. 595, 211 N. Y. S.
382 (1925).
'Another objection which has been raised to this theory is that even with a very
liberal application of the third party beneficiary doctrine it is difficult to justify
the right of action commonly given certain parties. "It seems an unreal con-
clusion to say that when A promised a realty development company not to conduct
a business upon Blackacre, a contract was made of which an intended beneficiary
was A's son, B, in a suit against A's daughter C, upon descent and division of
Blackacre." CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND (1929)
151. While this objection might have some weight in a state such as New York
where the right of a third party beneficiary to a contract to sue is narrowly con-
fined, it should not present any difficulties in states where that right is not so
limited.
'Hurt v. Hejhal, 259 Ill. App. 221 (1930) ; Klug v. Kreisch, 246 Mich. 14, 224
N. W. 339 (1929); Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311
(1882) ; Starkey v. Gardner, 194 N. C. 74, 138 S. E. 408 (1927) ; Notes (1928) 54
A. L. R. 812; (1933) 85 A. L. R_ 985.
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suggested a recovery of damages after denial of the injunction.8 But
this is in effect to force a sale of a property right for a private purpose.9
In view of these difficulties the following has been suggested as a
better solution: while these restrictions are servitudes on the land
itself, and should be enforced as such, when the purpose of the restric-
tion can no longer be carried out the servitude comes to an end for all
purposes; i.e., the duration of the servitude is determined by its pur-
pose.1 o
The North Carolina Court has in effect reached this very result. In
Starkey v. Gardner" an injunction was denied on the ground that
changed conditions had made impossible the fulfillment of the purpose
for which the restriction was imposed. The judgment of the lower
court, affirmed on appeal, was that "the restrictions created in said
deed ...are no longer in effect, and the property of the defendant
is no longer subject to said restrictions, ... and that the said defend-
ant, her agents or assigns, are not bound by the terms of said restric-
tions, and they are permitted to use said lands and property for any
lawful purposes."'12 There is here no hint of the possibility that the
restriction is still alive for the purpose of collecting damages for its
breach. This conclusion receives additional support in the recent case
of Snyder v. Caldwell.13 This was an action by the vendor for specific
performance of a contract to exchange lands. The vendee had refused
to accept a deed on the ground that the plaintiff could not convey good
title since there was a restrictive covenant. But the court held for the
plaintiff, basing its decision on the Starkey case, and holding that the
restriction was no longer enforceable because of changed conditions.
While the case does not specifically exclude the possibility that damages
might still be collected at law, it is a familiar rule that the purchaser of
land is not required to accept a title which invites or exposes him to
S Ewertsen v. Gerstenberg, 186 Ill. 344, 57 N. E. 1051 (1900) ; Jackson v.
Stevenson, 156 Mass. 496, 31 N. E. 691 (1892); Page v. Murray, 46 N. J. Eq.
325, 19 Atl. 11 (1890) ; McClure v. Leaycraft, 183 N. Y. 36, 75 N. E. 961 (1905).
'A statute which sought to provide expressly for the procedure adopted offhand
by the decisions -was held unconstitutional as depriving the dominant owners of
rights in real property for a private use contrary to the Bill of Rights, in River-
bank Improvement Co. v. Chadwick, 228 Mass. 242, 117 N. E. 244 (1917).
" "When such burdens are terminated by change in the character of the
neighborhood-now a recognized form of termination-or otherwise, the interest
definitely ceases. No pale relics are left to trouble and not to benefit the property
owners." CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND (1929) 153;
Pound, The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919; Equitable Servitudes (1919) 33
HARv. L. REv. 813.
21194 N. C. 74, 138 S. E. 408 (1927). This case is followed in Higgins v.
Hough, 195 N. C. 652, 143 S. E. 212 (1928); Oldham v. McPheeters, 203 N. C.
141, 164 S. E. 731 (1932).
1 Italics added.
1207 N. C. 626, 178 S. E. 83 (1935).
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litigation.14 It would seem inferentially, therefore, that the title of. the
plaintiff in the instant case was now clear of the restriction even to the
extent of being free from the possibility of liability for damages because
of breach of the restriction. In short, the net effect of the North Caro-
lina cases is that the restriction may be terminated by changed condi-
tions, and when so terminated it is ended for all purposes.
F. M. PARxER.
Wills-Remainders-Life Tenant Vested with
Absolute Power of Disposal.
The testator devised his real property to his wife giving her the
"right and privilege to use, sell or dispose of the same as she may see
fit during her lifetime," and he further provided that any property re-
maining at his wife's death should belong to the plaintiff. At her death
the wife devised the property to the defendant. The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals adhered to an "ancient rule" in holding that
the testator's will vested a fee simple estate in the wife thereby cutting
off the plaintiff's remainder.1
It is generally accepted that a remainder over after a devise of an
unlimited estate plus an absolute power of disposal is invalid since the
first taker is vested with a fee simple.2 A few jurisdictions, including
West Virginia, have held that a devise of a life estate and the attach-
ment thereto of an unlimited power of disposition created a fee simple
in the life tenant to the exclusion of any remainder.3 The fee simple
estate thus vested was subject to all incidents normally attended upon
" Wesley v. Eells, 177 U. S. 370, 44 L. ed. 811, 20 Sup. Ct. 661 (1900).
'Hustead v. Murray, 177 S. E. 898 (W. Va., 1934).
In this case note the author has endeavored, in so far as it was possible, to
consider only those cases in which a life estate in realty was expressly limited to
the first taker and in which his -power of disposal was unlimited. However, some
of the difficulties involved in any classification or generalization concerning the
construction of wills are indicated in the following quotation: "Seldom, if ever,
vill two wills be found the exact counterpart of each other, either in language or
circumstances. We may look to cases for general rules as guides, but, after all,
each case must be decided upon the language used by the testator,- and upon his
intention, to be gathered from the whole instrument." Jones v. Denning, 91 Mich..
481, 51 N. W. 1119 (1892).
2 Hambright v. Carroll, 204 N. C. 496, 168 S. E. 817 (1933) ; see Gildersleeve
v. Lee, 100 Ore. 578, 198 Pac. 246 (1921). RooD, WILus (2nd ed. 1926) 534.
Note (1931) 75 A. L. R. 71.
' Gibson v. Gibson, 213 Mich. 31, 181 N. W. 41 (1921) ; Van Deventer v. Mc-
Mullen, 157 Tenn. 571, 11 S. W. (2d) 867 (1928) ; Steffey v. King, 126 Va. 120,
101 S. E. 62 (1919) ; National Surety Co. v. Jarrett, 95 W. Va. 420, 121 S. E. 291
(1924) ; Notes (1925) 36 A. L. R. 1218; (1932) 76 A. L. R. 1166.
However, the attachment of a limited power of disposition would not enlarge
the life tenant's interest to a fee. Waller v. Sproles, 160 Tenn. 11, 22 S. W. (2d)
4 (1929) ; Woodbridge v. Woodbridge, 88 W. Va. 187, 106 S. E. 437 (1921) ; Note
(1930) 8 TENN L. Rv. 209.
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such an estate.4 This rule was based upon the theory that the re-
mainder was subordinate and repugnant to the power of disposition and
was consequently void.8  In this effort to be consistent the courts
violated the primary axiom( of testamentary construction by ignoring,
at least partially, the apparent intention of the testator; and, motivated
by a desire to protect this intention these jurisdictions have enacted
statutes which preserve the remainder if the life tenant fails to exercise
his power to dispose of the property.7 The West Virginia statute was
not applied in the principal case because the will involved took effect
several years prior to the statute's adoption.8
However, the prevailing authorities hold that the addition of a
power of disposal does not enlarge a life estate into a fee," but in
exercising the power the holder of the life estate may convey a fee. 10
Only a few jurisdictions limit his power of disposition to his own life
estate." Thus the life tenant is vested with authority sufficient to
For example, the first taker could convey a good title in fee simple to a
purchaser. Van Deventer v. McMullen, 157 Tenn. 571, 11 S. W. (2d) 867 (1928).
The property could be subjected to execution for obligations of the holder. Na-
tional Surety Co. v. Jarrett, 95 W. Va. 420, 121 S. E. 291 (1924). If the holder
died intestate the property passed to his heirs under the canons of descent. Brad-
ley v. Carnes, 94 Tenn. 27, 27 S. W. 1007 (1894).
See Bowen's Adm'r v. Bowen's Adm'r, 87 Va. 438, 12 S. E. 885 (1891);
Morgan v. Morgan, 60 W. Va. 327, 55 S. E. 389 (1906).
',"It has been declared a fundamental maxim, the first and greatest rule, the
sovereign guide, the polar star, in giving effect to a will, that the intention of the
testator as expressed in the will is to be fully and practically observed so far as
it is consistent with established rules of law." ROOD, WLLS, (2nd ed. 1926) 352.
"MICH. Com!P. LAws (1929) §13003; TENN. CODE (1932) §8093; VA. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1930) §5147; W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 36 art. 1 §16. See Quarton v.
Barton, 249 Mich. 474, 229 N. W. 465 (1930) ; Southworth v. Sullivan, 162 Va.
325, 173 S. E. 524 (1934).
' This will under which the plaintiff claims became effective in 1926 while the
West Virginia statute was not enacted until 1931. In speaking of the statute,
Judge Kenna, the author of the opinion in the principal case, said, "It is to be
hoped that it may be the means of freeing the courts of the state from adherence
to an ancient rule, the effect of which is to defeat in part the apparent purpose of
the testator."
'Paxton v. Paxton, 141 Iowa 96, 119 N. W. 284 (1909) ; Greenwalt v. Keller,
75 Kan. 578, 90 Pac. 233 (1907) ; Cagle v. Hampton, 196 N. C. 470, 146 S. E. 88
(1929); Notes (1925) 36 A. L. R. 1177; (1932) 76 A. L. R. 1153; RooD, WLLS
(2nd ed. 1926) 535.
10Heney v. Manion, 14 Del. Ch. 167, 123 Atl. 183 (1924); Cagle v. Hampton,
196 N. C. 470, 146 S. E. 88 (1929) (the court grants specific performance of a
contract to convey land where the seller was a life tenant possessing an absolute
power of disposal) ; Auer v. Brown, 121 Wis. 115, 98 N. W. 966 (1904).
"Brant v. Virginia Coal & Iron Co., 93 U. S. 326, 23 L. ed. 927 (1876) ; Patty
v. Goolsby, 51 Ark. 61, 9 S. W. 846 (1888); Douglas v. Sharp, 52 Ark. 113. 12
S. W. 202 (1889); Bachtell v. Bachtell, 135 Md. 474, 109 AtI. 198 (1920). But
cf. Archer v. Palmer, 112 Ark. 527, 167 S. W. 99 (1914); Reeside v. Annex
Building Ass'n, 165 Md. 200, 167 Atl. 72 (1933).
Some courts follow this rule: where a power of disposal accompanies a devise
of a life estate, the -power is limited to such a disposal as a tenant for life can
make, unless there are other words clearly indicating that a larger power was
intended. Pratt v. Skiff, 289 Ill. 268, 124 N. E. 534 (1919); Winchester v.
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defeat the remainder, 'but it must be used in good faith.1 2 A fraudulent
conveyance for the sole purpose of cutting off the remainder will be
void.' 3 Liability for waste will attach where the value of the remainder
is diminished by reckless and extravagant use. 14 Many states have
statutes which enlarge the life tenant's estate to a fee where the interests
of creditors and purchasers for value are involved, 15 but in the absence
of statute the creditors of the life tenant cannot subject the fee to
execution for the satisfaction of his obligations.' 6 In the assessment of
inheritance taxes 17 and the allotment of dower' 8 the holder's interest
is deemed to be only a life estate. While the power of disposition
authorizes the life tenant to transfer an estate in fee he cannot convey
such an interest by gift inter vivos"9 or by devise, 20 and the authorities
differ as to his ability to encumber the remainder with a mortgage.2 1
Hoover, 42 Ore. 314, 70 Pac. 1035 (1902). However, words indicative of the
larger power are usually uncovered. Gildersleeve v. Lee, 100 Ore. 578, 198 Pac.
246 (1921).
' See Braley v. Spraggins, 221 Ala. 150, 128 So. 149 (1930) ; Reddin v. Cottrell.
178 Ark. 1178, 13 S. W. (2d) 813 (1929); Shapleigh v. Shapleigh, 69 N. H. 577,
44 Atl.,107 (1899); Gibony v. Hutcheson, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 581, 50 S. W. 648
(1899).
Cales v. Dressier, 315 Ill. 142, 146 N. E. 162 (1924) ; lit re Davies' Estate,
242 N. Y. 196, 151 N. E. 205 (1926).
'Cross v. Hendry, 39 Ind. App. 246, 79 N. E. 531 (1906) (an injunction
against waste was granted) ; see Shapleigh v. Shapleigh, 69 N. H. 577, 44 At. 107
(1899) ; Ballinger v. Bartolett, 3 N. J. Misc. Rep. 80, 127 Atl. 671 (1925) ; Johnson
v. Johnson, 51 Ohio St. 446, 38 N. E. 61 (1894). Contra: Young v. Campbell,
175 S. W. 1100 (Tex. Civ. App., 1915) (a plea for an injunction to -prohibit
wasteful disposition denied) ; see Brant v. Va. Coal & Iron Co., 93 U. S. 326, 23
L. ed. 927 (1876).
For example: ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) §6928; N. Y. CoNsoL. LAWS
(Cahill, 1930) c. 51, §149; OKLA. CoMP. ST. (1921) §8522; Wis. REv. ST. (1927)
§232.08.
"0 Pace v. Pace, 41 Ohio App. 130, 180 N. E. 81 (1931).
'Kemp v. Kemp, 223 Mass. 32, 111 N. E. 673 (1916) ; In re Meldrum's Estate,
149 Minn. 342, 183 N. W. 835 (1921) ; lit re Sonnenburg's Estate, 133 Misc. Rep.
42, 231 N. Y. S. 191 (1928).
's In re Davies' Estate, 124 Misc. Rep. 541, 209 N. Y. S. 296 (1925).
10 Methodist Episcopal Church v. Walters, 50 F. (2d) 416 (W. D. Mo. 1928);
Adams v. Prather, 176 Cal. 33, 167 Pac. 534 (1917) ; Evans v. Leer, 232 Ky. 358,
23 S. W. (2d) 553 (1930) ; Johnson v. Johnson, 51 Ohio St. 446, 38 N. E. 61
(1894) ; see Quarton v. Barton, 249 Mich. 474, 229 N. W. 465 (1930) ; Holland
v. Bogardus-Hill Drug Co., 314 Mo. 214, 284 S. W. 121 (1926). Contra: in re
Cooksey's Estate, 203 Iowa 754, 208 N. W. 337 (1926) (the life tenant received a
nominal consideration); see Bynum v. Swope, 201 Ala. 19, 75 So. 170 (1917);
In re Ithaca Trust Co., 220 N. Y. 437, 116 N. E. 102 (1917).
In some instances gifts to charity are permissible. Dana v. Dana, 185 Mass.
156, 70 N. E. 49 (1904) ; Thrall v. Spear, 63 Vt. 266, 22 Atl. 414 (1891).
' Smith v. Judge, 133 Kan. 112, 298 Pac. 651 (1931) ; Struck v. Lilly, 219 Ky.
604, 293 S. W. 153 (1927) ; Selig v. Trost, 110 Miss. 584, 70 So. 699 (1916)
Jones v. Fullbright, 197 N. C. 274, 148 S. E. 229 (1929) (personal property);
Mooy v. Gallagher, 36 R. I. 405, 90 At. 663 (1914). Contra: Burbank v.
Sweeney, 161 Mass. 490. 37 N. E. 669 (1894). But cf. Ford v. Ticknor, 169 Mass.
276, 47 N. E. 877 (1897).
'
t The life tenant has no difficulty making a valid mortgage on the fee where
the terms constituting the power of disposition expressly include this authority.
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Once he has exercised his power of disposition, the life tenant is under
no obligation to account for the proceeds, 2 2 but at his death any of the
proceeds which remain in his possession, whether in the form of money
or other property, will pass to the remainderman.2 3
As a whole these conclusions are satisfactory. By permitting the
life tenant to transfer a fee and yet protecting the remainder by the
regulations attendant upon the disposition of the proceeds, the courts
have succeeded in giving full effect to the apparent intention of the
testator. Furthermore, substantial justice has resulted as the rights of
all interested parties are amply protected.
N. A. TOWNSEND, JR.
Wills-Requirements for Holographs---Printed Forms.
The testatrix's will, attested by two witnesses, was written by her
own hand in the blanks of a printed will form, a part of which was torn
Reeside v. Annex Building Ass'n, 165 Md. 200, 167 Atl. 72 (1933) ; Selig v. Trost,
110 Miss. 584, 70 So. 699 (1916). If the power of disposition is absolute the life
tenant's mortgage on the fee is valid. Kent v. Morrison, 153 Mass. 137, 26 N. E.
427 (1891) ; Whitfield v. Lyon, 93 Miss. 443, 46 So. 545 (1908) ; Grace v. Perry,
197 Mo. 550, 95 S. W. 875 (1906); Lord v. Roberts, 84 N. H. 517, 153 Atl. 1(1931) ; Rose City Co. v. Langloe, 141 Ore. 242, 16 P. (2d) 22 (1932) ; see Hamil-
ton v. Hamilton, 141 Iowa 321, 128 N. W. 380 (1910). Hdwever, there is some
conflicting authority. Downie v. Downie, 4 Fed. 55, (C. C. Ind. 1880) ; see Thrall
v. Spear, 63 Vt. 266, 22 Atl. 414 (1891). In Rhode Island a mortgage of the fee
by a life tenant who has a power of disposal is good provided the proceeds are
used to erect improvements on the property. In re Jenks, 21 R. I. 390, 43 AtI.
871 (1899).
'Keniston v. Mayhew, 169 Mass. 612, 47 N. E. 612 (1897) ; Redman v. Barger,
118 Mo. 568, 24 S. W. 177 (1893) ; see Alford v. Alford, 56 Ala. 350 (1876).
Bynum v. Swope, 201 Ala. 19, 75 So. 170 (1917) (the proceeds from the sale
of the property had been invested in other real estate) ; Walker v. Pritchard, 121
Ill. 221, 12 N. E. 336 (1887) (the life tenant still retained some of the money
received as the purchase price of the property); Barton v. Barton, 283 Ill. 388,
119 N. E. 320 (1918) ; In re Beatty's Estate, 172 Iowa 714, 154 N. W. 1028 (1915)(the proceeds of the sale were traced to a bank deposit) ; Olson v. Weber, 194
Iowa 512, 187 N. W. 465 (1922) (the proceeds from the sale were used to buy
another tract of land which was exchanged for a third) ; In re Eddy's Adm'r, 134
Misc. Rep. 511, 236 N. Y. S. 275 (1929) (the money received from the sale of the
property was traced to certain stocks and bonds) ; see In re McCullough's Estate,
272 Pa. 509, 116 Atl. 477 (1922) ; cf. Davis v. Badlam, 165 Mass. 248, 43 N. E. 91(1896). Contra: McMurray v. Stanley, 69 Tex. 139, 6 S. W. 412 (1887) ; Feegles
v. Slaughter, 182 S. W. 10 (Tex. Civ. App., 1916).
In some instances the life tenant is only entitled to a share of the proceeds
coexistent with his life estate with the residue immediately becoming the property
of the remainderman. Darden v. Mathews, 173 N. C. 186, 91 S. E. 835 (1917)
see it re Meldrum's Estate, 149 Minn. 342, 183 N. W. 835 (1921).
This problem was raised in a recent North Carolina case, Fletcher v. Bray, 201
N. C. 763, 161 S. E. 383 (1931), in which the life tenant was given the power to
dispose of the growing timber. In holding that the proceeds from the sale of the
timber belonged to the life tenant's heirs rather than the remainderman the court
distinguished the case of Darden v. Mathews, 173 N. C. 186, 91 S. E. 835 (1917)
on the ground that it involved a bare power of sale and not an absolute power
of disposal.
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off, destroying portions of the writing on both sides of the sheet. The
instrument was admitted to probate as a holographic will. Held, the
mere presence of printed words on the sheet will not invalidate the
instrument as a holographic will if the printing is not essential to the
meaning of the handwriting, and the writing itself contains dispositive
words sufficient to make a complete will in itself. In such a case the
printed words are disregarded as being mere surplusage,'
Requirements for the valid execution of holographic wills are pre-
scribed by statutes in the various states, which usually provide that the
will must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator in his
own handwriting.2 The construction of such wills in which printed
matter appears has been based on two theories :3. (1) whatever the testa-
tdr intended to include as a part of the instrument is a part of the will,4
and (2) whatever is not essential to the meaning of the written words
is mere surplusage and is not to be construed with the will.,
Under the intent theory, any printed word which the testator in-
tended to include as a part of the will invalidates it ;6 the mere presence
of printed words on the sheet is immaterial only if they are entirely
dissociated from the will and not intended as a part thereof.7 For in-
stance, a will in which part of the year date was printed was denied
probate even though the instrument had also been dated entirely in the
handwriting of the testator.8 However, in a later case from the same
jurisdiction another will of this nature was held to have been properly
executed where the testator subsequently dated the instrument in his
own handwriting. 9  Various cases have held instruments invalid which
were entirely in the testator's handwriting except for part of 'the figures
in the year date.10
'it re Will of Parsons, 207 N. C. 584, 178 S. E. 78 (1934).
'However, some states do not require that the instrument be dated, and two
states (N. C. and Tenn.) make the additional requirement that the purported will
be found among the valuable papers of deceased to show that some importance is
attached to it as a testamentary disposition. For a compilation of state statutes,
see Bordwell, Statute Law of Wills (1928) 14 IowA L. Rav. 1, 25. In North
Carolina the vill must be entirely written, but not necessarily dated, in the hand-
writing of the testator, with his name inserted in some part thereof, and the hand-
writing must be proved by three credible witnesses; in addition the document must
be found among the valuable -papers of the deceased, N. C. CODE ANN., (Michie,
1931), §§4131, 4144 (2).
a Mechem, Integration of Holographic Wills (1934) 12 N. C. L. lREv. 213.
'I, re Thorn's Estate, 183 Cal. 512, 192 Pac. 19 (1920) ; In re Francis' Estate,
191 Cal. 600. 217 Pac. 746 (1923).
'Gooch v. Gooch, 134 Va. 21, 113 S. E. 873 (1922).
'Estate of Billings, 64 Cal. 427, 1 Pac. 701 (1884).
In re Oldham's Estate, 203 Cal. 618, 265 Pac. 183 (1928) (the will was written
on a letterhead).
'In re Francis' Estate, 191 Cal. 600, 217 Pac. 746 (1923).
'In re Whitney's Estate, 103 Cal. App. 577, 284 Pac. 1067 (1930).
"o Estate of Billings, 64 Cal. 427, 1 Pac. 701 (1884).
It re Plumel's Estate, 151 Cal. 77, 90 Pac. 192 (1907) ; In re Francis's Estate,
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The following cases are not clearly within either the intent or sur-
plusage theories :11 In Mississippi, where the whole will was written
except for the caption "My Will" the court said that the printed words
would not affect the validity of a will unless without them the meaning
and purpose were in some may materially affected. 12 In Louisiana a
will containing a printed year date was rejected, since a date was neces-
sary under the statute ;13 but in a subsequent case a will containing two
immaterial words in another's handwriting was admitted to probate on
the ground that the presence or absence of the words would not change
the meaning or alter the provisions made by testator in his own hand-
writing.14
Under the surplusage theory, the will will be allowed to stand if the
written portions are sufficient to make a testamentary disposition of the
property without the aid of the printed words. 15 Few cases are clearly
within this theory,16 but in Gooch v. Gooch17 the Virginia court upheld
a will written on a printed form, and allowed it to revive a previously
revoked will, saying that if the written portions of the will are com-
plete and entire in themselves the printed portions may be regarded as
surplusage.
Where the instrument is typewritten, even by the testator himself,
it is not good as a holographic will under either theory.'8 Typewriting
is essentially a process of printing, and "writing" means a mannerism
in the formation of letters, by which the testator may be identified with
the instrument offered for probate.
The North Carolina statute provides in effect that the will and every
part thereof must be in the testator's own handwriting, 19 and it is said
191 Cal. 600, 217 Pac. 746 (1923) ; Succession of Robertson, 49 La. Ann. 868, 21
So. 586 (1897). But see it re Whitney's Estate, 103 Cal. App. 577, 284 Pac. 1067(1930); Jones v. Kyle, 168 La. 728, 123 So. 306 (1929). In these two cases a
date subsequently written in the testator's own handwriting was sufficient even
where the previous date was printed.
The surplusage theory condones any writing sufficient to stand alone as a
testamentary disposition. These cases, while not depending entirely on the testa-
tor's intent, do not follow the liberal surplusage theory announced by the North
Carolina court, and the result-something of a cross between the intent and
surplusage doctrines-is based on the holding that printed matter, even where it
is intended to be included in the will by the testator, will invalidate the will only
if it materially affects the meaning of the written words.
' Baker v. Brown, 83 Miss. 793, 36 So. 539 (1904).
" Succession of Robertson, 49 La. Ann. 868, 21 So. 586 (1897). But see Jones
v. Kyle, 168 La. 728, 123 So. 306 (1929) (a subsequent dating in the testator's
handwriting was sufficient even where the previous date was printed).
I Heirs of McMichael v. Bankston, 24 La. Ann. 451 (1872).
'In re Lowrance's Will, 199 N. C. 782, 155 S. E. 876 (1930).
"' See note 11, supra. 27 134 Va. 21, 113 S. E. 873 (1922).
'In re Dreyfus' Estate, 175 Cal. 417, 165 Pac. 941 (1917) ; Adams' Executrix
v. Beaumont, 226 Ky. 311, 10 S. W. (2d) 1106 (1928) ; see Langfit v. Langfit,
108 W. Va. 466, 151 S. E. 715 (1930).
"N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §§4131, 4144 (2).
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that the provisions of the statute are mandatory, not directory ;2o yet the
court in the instant case has effectively changed the statute to read((every portion thereof which is in the handwriting of the testator and
testamentary in its nature may be admitted to probate." 21 Other courts
under substantially the same statute, have held purported holographic
wills written on printed forms invalid.2 2 Only the Virginia case,
Gooch v. Gooch,23 sustains the extreme position taken by the North
Carolina court. Considered academically the instant case seems to have
been wrongly decided, but as a matter of practical policy the decision
may be correct on principle if not on the facts. The legislature was
obviously attempting to protect the testator from fraud practiced after
his death, on the theory that handwriting may be sufficiently identified
to connect the testator with anything he himself might write.24 There
is nothing about the printed form of a will which can be altered to
change the testator's wishes, and he is just as much connected with the
form through his writing in the blanks as in a paper written entirely
by himself, for the dispositive portions of the will are entirely in the
handwriting of the maker of the will. However, the court holds that
the printed portions of a purported will must be disregarded for the
purposes of the statute where the writing is sufficient to stand alone.
It is doubtful if this instrument shows any testamentary intent on its
face without the aid of the printed portions, as the testatrix merely
writes "I give etc.," which is entirely consistent with the idea of a gift
inter vivos, invalid because not completed by delivery during the lifetime
of the donor.2 5 Parol evidence was admitted in the case, not to explain
the language used by the testatrix, and to prove that she intended it to
operate as a posthumous disposition of her property, but to show that
the instrument actually disposed of her property in accordance with the
expressed wishes of the testatrix. In fact, no evidence was disclosed by
the opinion relating directly to this instrument itself, but the court
apparently is influenced by the subsequent declarations of the testatrix
' "The provisions of the statute are, of course, mandatory, and not directory,
and therefore there must be a strict compliance with them, before there can be a
valid execution and probate of a holographic script as a will; but this does not
,mean that the construction of the statute should be so rigid and binding as to
defeat its clearly expressed purpose. It must be construed and enforced strictly,
but at the same time reasonably." In re Jenkins' Will, 157 N. C. 429, 435, 72 S. E.
1072, 1074 (1911) ; In re Will of Low;rance, 199 N. C. 782, 155 S. E. 876 (1930).
"1 See Estate of Rand, 61 Cal. 468, 44 Am. Rep. 555 (1882).
'In re Wolcott's Estate, 54 Utah 165, 180 Pac. 169 (1919) ("The fact that
the matter -vritten -by deceased in her own hand, standing alone, might constitute
a complete testamentary disposition of the property, does not alter the case." Such
writing is not what testatrix prepared as her will), Estate of Rand, 61 Cal. 468,
468 Am. Rep. 555 (1882).
'134 Va. 21, 113 S. E. 873 (1922).
' Alexander v. Johnson, 171 N. C. 468, 88 S. E. 785 (1916).
Adams v. Mars, 213 S. W. "622 (Tex. Com. App., 1919).
